/mbedtls-latest/tests/suites/ |
D | test_suite_constant_time.data | 13 mbedtls_ct_memcmp NULL 16 mbedtls_ct_memcmp len 1 17 mbedtls_ct_memcmp:-1:1:0 19 mbedtls_ct_memcmp len 3 20 mbedtls_ct_memcmp:-1:3:0 22 mbedtls_ct_memcmp len 4 23 mbedtls_ct_memcmp:-1:4:0 25 mbedtls_ct_memcmp len 5 26 mbedtls_ct_memcmp:-1:5:0 28 mbedtls_ct_memcmp len 15 [all …]
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D | test_suite_constant_time.function | 28 TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ct_memcmp(&x, NULL, 0) == 0); 29 TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ct_memcmp(NULL, &x, 0) == 0); 30 TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ct_memcmp(NULL, NULL, 0) == 0); 209 int result = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(a, b, size); 224 result = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(a, b, size); 243 void mbedtls_ct_memcmp(int same, int size, int offset) 267 int actual = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(a + offset, b + offset, size);
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/mbedtls-latest/include/mbedtls/ |
D | constant_time.h | 32 int mbedtls_ct_memcmp(const void *a,
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/mbedtls-latest/library/ |
D | nist_kw.c | 358 diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(NIST_KW_ICV1, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH); in mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap() 402 diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(NIST_KW_ICV2, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2); in mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap()
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D | constant_time.c | 68 int mbedtls_ct_memcmp(const void *a, in mbedtls_ct_memcmp() function
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D | ssl_cookie.c | 354 if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(cookie + 4, ref_hmac, sizeof(ref_hmac)) != 0) { in mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check()
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D | chachapoly.c | 311 diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag, check_tag, sizeof(check_tag)); in mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt()
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D | psa_crypto_mac.c | 445 if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(mac, actual_mac, mac_length) != 0) { in mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish()
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D | cipher.c | 1272 if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag, check_tag, tag_len) != 0) { in mbedtls_cipher_check_tag() 1293 if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag, check_tag, tag_len) != 0) { in mbedtls_cipher_check_tag()
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D | rsa.c | 1994 bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_bool(mbedtls_ct_memcmp(lhash, p, hlen))); in mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt() 2475 if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(verif, sig, ctx->len) != 0) { in mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign() 2719 if ((ret = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(encoded, encoded_expected, in mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify()
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D | ccm.c | 576 int diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag1, tag2, tag_len); in mbedtls_ccm_compare_tags()
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D | ssl_tls13_server.c | 383 mbedtls_ct_memcmp(ssl->conf->psk_identity, in ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match() 451 if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(server_computed_binder, in ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_binder_match()
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D | gcm.c | 760 diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag, check_tag, tag_len); in mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt()
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D | ssl_tls13_generic.c | 1113 if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(buf, in ssl_tls13_parse_finished_message()
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D | ssl_tls12_client.c | 626 mbedtls_ct_memcmp(buf + 1, in ssl_parse_renegotiation_info() 628 mbedtls_ct_memcmp(buf + 1 + ssl->verify_data_len, in ssl_parse_renegotiation_info()
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D | ssl_tls12_server.c | 116 mbedtls_ct_memcmp(buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data, in ssl_parse_renegotiation_info() 3645 mbedtls_ct_memcmp(ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n) != 0) { in ssl_parse_client_psk_identity()
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D | psa_crypto.c | 2469 if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(hash, actual_hash, actual_hash_length) != 0) { 2539 if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(hash, actual_hash, actual_hash_length) != 0) { 2954 if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(mac, actual_mac, actual_mac_length) != 0) {
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D | ssl_msg.c | 1795 if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(data + rec->data_len, mac_expect, in mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf() 2068 if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(mac_peer, mac_expect, in mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf()
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D | psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h | 2474 mbedtls_ct_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_length ) in psa_driver_wrapper_aead_verify()
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D | ssl_tls.c | 8457 if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl), in mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished()
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/mbedtls-latest/tests/src/drivers/ |
D | test_driver_aead.c | 424 mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag, check_tag, tag_length) in mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_verify()
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/mbedtls-latest/docs/ |
D | psa-transition.md | 260 Note that the PSA API does include features that reduce the need for `mbedtls_ct_memcmp`: 262 …ue, use `psa_mac_verify` rather than `psa_mac_compute` followed by `mbedtls_ct_memcmp`, or use `ps… 554 …d be in constant time to avoid a side channel vulnerability, for example using `mbedtls_ct_memcmp`. 562 …d be in constant time to avoid a side channel vulnerability, for example using `mbedtls_ct_memcmp`.
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/mbedtls-latest/scripts/data_files/driver_templates/ |
D | psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h.jinja | 2096 mbedtls_ct_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_length )
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/mbedtls-latest/ |
D | ChangeLog | 1516 * Add new API mbedtls_ct_memcmp for constant time buffer comparison.
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