| /mbedtls-latest/tests/suites/ |
| D | test_suite_chacha20.function | 13 int counter,
29 TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_chacha20_crypt(key_str->x, nonce_str->x, counter, src_str->len, src_str->x,
42 TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_chacha20_starts(&ctx, nonce_str->x, counter) == 0);
56 TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_chacha20_starts(&ctx, nonce_str->x, counter) == 0);
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| D | test_suite_ctr_drbg.data | 1109 Increment counter rollover
1112 Increment counter 00
1115 Increment counter ff00
1118 Increment counter ff0000
1121 Increment counter ff000000
1124 Increment counter ff00000000
1127 Increment counter ff0000000000
1130 Increment counter ff000000000000
1133 Increment counter 01
1136 Increment counter ff01
[all …]
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| D | test_suite_ssl.function | 1271 * 2) The record counter sometimes determines the IV.
2773 srv_pattern.counter = 0;
2774 cli_pattern.counter = 0;
2792 TEST_ASSERT(srv_pattern.counter >= 1);
2796 TEST_ASSERT(cli_pattern.counter >= 1);
3112 srv_pattern.counter = 0;
3157 TEST_EQUAL(srv_pattern.counter, 1);
3891 TEST_EQUAL(server_pattern.counter, 1);
5004 TEST_EQUAL(server_pattern.counter, 1);
5005 server_pattern.counter = 0;
[all …]
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| D | test_suite_entropy.function | 53 * Just resetting the counter. New sources will overwrite existing ones.
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| D | test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.function | 3279 Adapt counter of expected hits. */
3289 Adapt counter of expected hits. */
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| D | test_suite_psa_crypto_se_driver_hal.function | 160 /* Allocate slot numbers with a monotonic counter. */
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| D | test_suite_bignum_core.function | 1024 * Fill the table with a unique counter so that differences are easily
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| D | test_suite_psa_crypto.data | 2490 # because the test vector starts at counter=1 but our API starts at counter=0.
2496 # because the test vector starts at counter=1 but our API starts at counter=0.
2803 # because the test vector starts at counter=1 but our API starts at counter=0.
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| /mbedtls-latest/library/ |
| D | ctr_drbg.c | 350 mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(ctx->counter); in ctr_drbg_update_internal()
356 status = psa_cipher_update(&ctx->psa_ctx.operation, ctx->counter, sizeof(ctx->counter), in ctr_drbg_update_internal()
364 ctx->counter, p)) != 0) { in ctr_drbg_update_internal()
391 memcpy(ctx->counter, tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE, in ctr_drbg_update_internal()
653 mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(ctx->counter); in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add()
662 status = psa_cipher_update(&ctx->psa_ctx.operation, ctx->counter, sizeof(ctx->counter), in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add()
670 ctx->counter, locals.tmp)) != 0) { in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add()
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| D | pkcs5.c | 281 unsigned char counter[4]; in pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac() local
283 memset(counter, 0, 4); in pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac()
284 counter[3] = 1; in pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac()
302 if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(ctx, counter, 4)) != 0) { in pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac()
343 if (++counter[i - 1] != 0) { in pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac()
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| D | chacha20.c | 183 uint32_t counter) in mbedtls_chacha20_starts() argument
186 ctx->state[12] = counter; in mbedtls_chacha20_starts()
247 uint32_t counter, in mbedtls_chacha20_crypt() argument
262 ret = mbedtls_chacha20_starts(&ctx, nonce, counter); in mbedtls_chacha20_crypt()
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| D | rsa.c | 1621 unsigned char counter[4]; in mgf_mask() local
1644 memset(counter, 0, 4); in mgf_mask()
1661 if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, counter, 4)) != 0) { in mgf_mask()
1672 counter[3]++; in mgf_mask()
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| /mbedtls-latest/include/mbedtls/ |
| D | chacha20.h | 117 uint32_t counter);
183 uint32_t counter,
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| D | ctr_drbg.h | 186 unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(counter)[16]; /*!< The counter (V). */
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| /mbedtls-latest/tests/include/test/ |
| D | ssl_helpers.h | 87 size_t counter; member
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| /mbedtls-latest/docs/architecture/psa-thread-safety/ |
| D | psa-thread-safety.md | 159 Each key slot has a state variable and a `registered_readers` counter. These two variables dictate …
231 …'s state is `PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION` and the slot's registered reader counter is equal to 1. Th…
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| /mbedtls-latest/tests/src/test_helpers/ |
| D | ssl_helpers.c | 38 p->counter++; in mbedtls_test_ssl_log_analyzer()
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| /mbedtls-latest/docs/proposed/ |
| D | psa-driver-interface.md | 1162 …counter with a practically unbounded range in the secure element or in the driver's persistent sto…
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| /mbedtls-latest/ |
| D | ChangeLog | 2450 enclave) could bypass an existing counter-measure (base blinding) and
2549 * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when
3454 * Add a counter-measure against a vulnerability in TLS ciphersuites based
4191 would compare 64 bits of the record counter instead of 48 bits as indicated
5331 * RSA blinding on CRT operations to counter timing attacks
5513 * RSA blinding on CRT operations to counter timing attacks
5567 * Corrected GCM counter incrementation to use only 32-bits instead of
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