1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
2 /*
3  * SafeSetID Linux Security Module
4  *
5  * Author: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
6  *
7  * Copyright (C) 2018 The Chromium OS Authors.
8  *
9  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as
11  * published by the Free Software Foundation.
12  *
13  */
14 
15 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "SafeSetID: " fmt
16 
17 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
18 #include <linux/module.h>
19 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
20 #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
21 #include <linux/security.h>
22 #include "lsm.h"
23 
24 /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
25 int safesetid_initialized;
26 
27 struct setuid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setuid_rules;
28 
29 /* Compute a decision for a transition from @src to @dst under @policy. */
_setuid_policy_lookup(struct setuid_ruleset * policy,kuid_t src,kuid_t dst)30 enum sid_policy_type _setuid_policy_lookup(struct setuid_ruleset *policy,
31 		kuid_t src, kuid_t dst)
32 {
33 	struct setuid_rule *rule;
34 	enum sid_policy_type result = SIDPOL_DEFAULT;
35 
36 	hash_for_each_possible(policy->rules, rule, next, __kuid_val(src)) {
37 		if (!uid_eq(rule->src_uid, src))
38 			continue;
39 		if (uid_eq(rule->dst_uid, dst))
40 			return SIDPOL_ALLOWED;
41 		result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
42 	}
43 	return result;
44 }
45 
46 /*
47  * Compute a decision for a transition from @src to @dst under the active
48  * policy.
49  */
setuid_policy_lookup(kuid_t src,kuid_t dst)50 static enum sid_policy_type setuid_policy_lookup(kuid_t src, kuid_t dst)
51 {
52 	enum sid_policy_type result = SIDPOL_DEFAULT;
53 	struct setuid_ruleset *pol;
54 
55 	rcu_read_lock();
56 	pol = rcu_dereference(safesetid_setuid_rules);
57 	if (pol)
58 		result = _setuid_policy_lookup(pol, src, dst);
59 	rcu_read_unlock();
60 	return result;
61 }
62 
safesetid_security_capable(const struct cred * cred,struct user_namespace * ns,int cap,unsigned int opts)63 static int safesetid_security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
64 				      struct user_namespace *ns,
65 				      int cap,
66 				      unsigned int opts)
67 {
68 	/* We're only interested in CAP_SETUID. */
69 	if (cap != CAP_SETUID)
70 		return 0;
71 
72 	/*
73 	 * If CAP_SETUID is currently used for a set*uid() syscall, we want to
74 	 * let it go through here; the real security check happens later, in the
75 	 * task_fix_setuid hook.
76 	 */
77 	if ((opts & CAP_OPT_INSETID) != 0)
78 		return 0;
79 
80 	/*
81 	 * If no policy applies to this task, allow the use of CAP_SETUID for
82 	 * other purposes.
83 	 */
84 	if (setuid_policy_lookup(cred->uid, INVALID_UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
85 		return 0;
86 
87 	/*
88 	 * Reject use of CAP_SETUID for functionality other than calling
89 	 * set*uid() (e.g. setting up userns uid mappings).
90 	 */
91 	pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETUID, which is not available to UID %u for operations besides approved set*uid transitions\n",
92 		__kuid_val(cred->uid));
93 	return -EPERM;
94 }
95 
96 /*
97  * Check whether a caller with old credentials @old is allowed to switch to
98  * credentials that contain @new_uid.
99  */
uid_permitted_for_cred(const struct cred * old,kuid_t new_uid)100 static bool uid_permitted_for_cred(const struct cred *old, kuid_t new_uid)
101 {
102 	bool permitted;
103 
104 	/* If our old creds already had this UID in it, it's fine. */
105 	if (uid_eq(new_uid, old->uid) || uid_eq(new_uid, old->euid) ||
106 	    uid_eq(new_uid, old->suid))
107 		return true;
108 
109 	/*
110 	 * Transitions to new UIDs require a check against the policy of the old
111 	 * RUID.
112 	 */
113 	permitted =
114 	    setuid_policy_lookup(old->uid, new_uid) != SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
115 	if (!permitted) {
116 		pr_warn("UID transition ((%d,%d,%d) -> %d) blocked\n",
117 			__kuid_val(old->uid), __kuid_val(old->euid),
118 			__kuid_val(old->suid), __kuid_val(new_uid));
119 	}
120 	return permitted;
121 }
122 
123 /*
124  * Check whether there is either an exception for user under old cred struct to
125  * set*uid to user under new cred struct, or the UID transition is allowed (by
126  * Linux set*uid rules) even without CAP_SETUID.
127  */
safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred * new,const struct cred * old,int flags)128 static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
129 				     const struct cred *old,
130 				     int flags)
131 {
132 
133 	/* Do nothing if there are no setuid restrictions for our old RUID. */
134 	if (setuid_policy_lookup(old->uid, INVALID_UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
135 		return 0;
136 
137 	if (uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->uid) &&
138 	    uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->euid) &&
139 	    uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->suid) &&
140 	    uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->fsuid))
141 		return 0;
142 
143 	/*
144 	 * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
145 	 * that could arise from a missing whitelist entry preventing a
146 	 * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
147 	 */
148 	force_sig(SIGKILL);
149 	return -EACCES;
150 }
151 
152 static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
153 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
154 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, safesetid_security_capable)
155 };
156 
safesetid_security_init(void)157 static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
158 {
159 	security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
160 			   ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
161 
162 	/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
163 	safesetid_initialized = 1;
164 
165 	return 0;
166 }
167 
168 DEFINE_LSM(safesetid_security_init) = {
169 	.init = safesetid_security_init,
170 	.name = "safesetid",
171 };
172