1 /*
2 * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
3 * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
4 *
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
7 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
8 *
9 * ima_policy.c
10 * - initialize default measure policy rules
11 *
12 */
13 #include <linux/module.h>
14 #include <linux/list.h>
15 #include <linux/fs.h>
16 #include <linux/security.h>
17 #include <linux/magic.h>
18 #include <linux/parser.h>
19 #include <linux/slab.h>
20 #include <linux/rculist.h>
21 #include <linux/genhd.h>
22 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
23
24 #include "ima.h"
25
26 /* flags definitions */
27 #define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
28 #define IMA_MASK 0x0002
29 #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
30 #define IMA_UID 0x0008
31 #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
32 #define IMA_FSUUID 0x0020
33 #define IMA_INMASK 0x0040
34 #define IMA_EUID 0x0080
35 #define IMA_PCR 0x0100
36 #define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200
37
38 #define UNKNOWN 0
39 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
40 #define DONT_MEASURE 0x0002
41 #define APPRAISE 0x0004 /* same as IMA_APPRAISE */
42 #define DONT_APPRAISE 0x0008
43 #define AUDIT 0x0040
44 #define HASH 0x0100
45 #define DONT_HASH 0x0200
46
47 #define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \
48 (a) >= (FIELD_SIZEOF(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8))
49
50 int ima_policy_flag;
51 static int temp_ima_appraise;
52 static int build_ima_appraise __ro_after_init;
53
54 #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
55 enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
56 LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
57 };
58
59 enum policy_types { ORIGINAL_TCB = 1, DEFAULT_TCB };
60
61 struct ima_rule_entry {
62 struct list_head list;
63 int action;
64 unsigned int flags;
65 enum ima_hooks func;
66 int mask;
67 unsigned long fsmagic;
68 uuid_t fsuuid;
69 kuid_t uid;
70 kuid_t fowner;
71 bool (*uid_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* Handlers for operators */
72 bool (*fowner_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* uid_eq(), uid_gt(), uid_lt() */
73 int pcr;
74 struct {
75 void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
76 void *args_p; /* audit value */
77 int type; /* audit type */
78 } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
79 char *fsname;
80 };
81
82 /*
83 * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
84 * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
85 */
86
87 /*
88 * The minimum rule set to allow for full TCB coverage. Measures all files
89 * opened or mmap for exec and everything read by root. Dangerous because
90 * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
91 * and running executables.
92 */
93 static struct ima_rule_entry dont_measure_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
94 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
95 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
96 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
97 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
98 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
99 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
100 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
101 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
102 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SMACK_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
103 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,
104 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
105 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC,
106 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
107 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}
108 };
109
110 static struct ima_rule_entry original_measurement_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
111 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
112 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
113 {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
114 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
115 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
116 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq,
117 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
118 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
119 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
120 };
121
122 static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
123 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
124 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
125 {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
126 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
127 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
128 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq,
129 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID},
130 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
131 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq,
132 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID},
133 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
134 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
135 {.action = MEASURE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
136 };
137
138 static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
139 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
140 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
141 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
142 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
143 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
144 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
145 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
146 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
147 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
148 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SMACK_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
149 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
150 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
151 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
152 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY
153 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK,
154 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
155 #endif
156 #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
157 {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .fowner_op = &uid_eq,
158 .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
159 #else
160 /* force signature */
161 {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .fowner_op = &uid_eq,
162 .flags = IMA_FOWNER | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
163 #endif
164 };
165
166 static struct ima_rule_entry build_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
167 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_MODULE_SIGS
168 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = MODULE_CHECK,
169 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
170 #endif
171 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_FIRMWARE_SIGS
172 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
173 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
174 #endif
175 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_KEXEC_SIGS
176 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
177 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
178 #endif
179 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS
180 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK,
181 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
182 #endif
183 };
184
185 static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
186 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = MODULE_CHECK,
187 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
188 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
189 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
190 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
191 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
192 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK,
193 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
194 };
195
196 static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
197 static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
198 static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules);
199 static struct list_head *ima_rules;
200
201 static int ima_policy __initdata;
202
default_measure_policy_setup(char * str)203 static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
204 {
205 if (ima_policy)
206 return 1;
207
208 ima_policy = ORIGINAL_TCB;
209 return 1;
210 }
211 __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
212
213 static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
214 static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata;
215 static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init;
policy_setup(char * str)216 static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
217 {
218 char *p;
219
220 while ((p = strsep(&str, " |\n")) != NULL) {
221 if (*p == ' ')
222 continue;
223 if ((strcmp(p, "tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy)
224 ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB;
225 else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_tcb") == 0)
226 ima_use_appraise_tcb = true;
227 else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0)
228 ima_use_secure_boot = true;
229 else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0)
230 ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = true;
231 }
232
233 return 1;
234 }
235 __setup("ima_policy=", policy_setup);
236
default_appraise_policy_setup(char * str)237 static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
238 {
239 ima_use_appraise_tcb = true;
240 return 1;
241 }
242 __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
243
244 /*
245 * The LSM policy can be reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring
246 * to the old, stale LSM policy. Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect
247 * the reloaded LSM policy. We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if
248 * they don't.
249 */
ima_lsm_update_rules(void)250 static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
251 {
252 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
253 int result;
254 int i;
255
256 list_for_each_entry(entry, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
257 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
258 if (!entry->lsm[i].rule)
259 continue;
260 result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[i].type,
261 Audit_equal,
262 entry->lsm[i].args_p,
263 &entry->lsm[i].rule);
264 BUG_ON(!entry->lsm[i].rule);
265 }
266 }
267 }
268
269 /**
270 * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
271 * @rule: a pointer to a rule
272 * @inode: a pointer to an inode
273 * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
274 * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated
275 * @func: LIM hook identifier
276 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
277 *
278 * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
279 */
ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry * rule,struct inode * inode,const struct cred * cred,u32 secid,enum ima_hooks func,int mask)280 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
281 const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
282 enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
283 {
284 int i;
285
286 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
287 (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
288 return false;
289 if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) &&
290 (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR))
291 return false;
292 if ((rule->flags & IMA_INMASK) &&
293 (!(rule->mask & mask) && func != POST_SETATTR))
294 return false;
295 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
296 && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
297 return false;
298 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSNAME)
299 && strcmp(rule->fsname, inode->i_sb->s_type->name))
300 return false;
301 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSUUID) &&
302 !uuid_equal(&rule->fsuuid, &inode->i_sb->s_uuid))
303 return false;
304 if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
305 return false;
306 if (rule->flags & IMA_EUID) {
307 if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) {
308 if (!rule->uid_op(cred->euid, rule->uid)
309 && !rule->uid_op(cred->suid, rule->uid)
310 && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
311 return false;
312 } else if (!rule->uid_op(cred->euid, rule->uid))
313 return false;
314 }
315
316 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) &&
317 !rule->fowner_op(inode->i_uid, rule->fowner))
318 return false;
319 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
320 int rc = 0;
321 u32 osid;
322 int retried = 0;
323
324 if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
325 continue;
326 retry:
327 switch (i) {
328 case LSM_OBJ_USER:
329 case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
330 case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
331 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
332 rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
333 rule->lsm[i].type,
334 Audit_equal,
335 rule->lsm[i].rule,
336 NULL);
337 break;
338 case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
339 case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
340 case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
341 rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
342 rule->lsm[i].type,
343 Audit_equal,
344 rule->lsm[i].rule,
345 NULL);
346 default:
347 break;
348 }
349 if ((rc < 0) && (!retried)) {
350 retried = 1;
351 ima_lsm_update_rules();
352 goto retry;
353 }
354 if (!rc)
355 return false;
356 }
357 return true;
358 }
359
360 /*
361 * In addition to knowing that we need to appraise the file in general,
362 * we need to differentiate between calling hooks, for hook specific rules.
363 */
get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry * rule,enum ima_hooks func)364 static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
365 {
366 if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC))
367 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
368
369 switch (func) {
370 case MMAP_CHECK:
371 return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
372 case BPRM_CHECK:
373 return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE;
374 case CREDS_CHECK:
375 return IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE;
376 case FILE_CHECK:
377 case POST_SETATTR:
378 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
379 case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
380 default:
381 return IMA_READ_APPRAISE;
382 }
383 }
384
385 /**
386 * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions
387 * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
388 * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
389 * being made
390 * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
391 * @func: IMA hook identifier
392 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
393 * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
394 *
395 * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
396 * conditions.
397 *
398 * Since the IMA policy may be updated multiple times we need to lock the
399 * list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous
400 * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
401 */
ima_match_policy(struct inode * inode,const struct cred * cred,u32 secid,enum ima_hooks func,int mask,int flags,int * pcr)402 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
403 enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr)
404 {
405 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
406 int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
407
408 rcu_read_lock();
409 list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
410
411 if (!(entry->action & actmask))
412 continue;
413
414 if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask))
415 continue;
416
417 action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS;
418
419 action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK;
420 if (entry->action & IMA_APPRAISE) {
421 action |= get_subaction(entry, func);
422 action &= ~IMA_HASH;
423 if (ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs)
424 action |= IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS;
425 }
426
427 if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
428 actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1);
429 else
430 actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action >> 1);
431
432 if ((pcr) && (entry->flags & IMA_PCR))
433 *pcr = entry->pcr;
434
435 if (!actmask)
436 break;
437 }
438 rcu_read_unlock();
439
440 return action;
441 }
442
443 /*
444 * Initialize the ima_policy_flag variable based on the currently
445 * loaded policy. Based on this flag, the decision to short circuit
446 * out of a function or not call the function in the first place
447 * can be made earlier.
448 */
ima_update_policy_flag(void)449 void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
450 {
451 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
452
453 list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) {
454 if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
455 ima_policy_flag |= entry->action;
456 }
457
458 ima_appraise |= (build_ima_appraise | temp_ima_appraise);
459 if (!ima_appraise)
460 ima_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
461 }
462
ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func)463 static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func)
464 {
465 if (func == MODULE_CHECK)
466 return IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES;
467 else if (func == FIRMWARE_CHECK)
468 return IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
469 else if (func == POLICY_CHECK)
470 return IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
471 else if (func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
472 return IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC;
473 return 0;
474 }
475
476 /**
477 * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
478 *
479 * ima_rules points to either the ima_default_rules or the
480 * the new ima_policy_rules.
481 */
ima_init_policy(void)482 void __init ima_init_policy(void)
483 {
484 int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries, secure_boot_entries;
485
486 /* if !ima_policy set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
487 measure_entries = ima_policy ? ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules) : 0;
488 appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
489 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
490 secure_boot_entries = ima_use_secure_boot ?
491 ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules) : 0;
492
493 for (i = 0; i < measure_entries; i++)
494 list_add_tail(&dont_measure_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
495
496 switch (ima_policy) {
497 case ORIGINAL_TCB:
498 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules); i++)
499 list_add_tail(&original_measurement_rules[i].list,
500 &ima_default_rules);
501 break;
502 case DEFAULT_TCB:
503 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules); i++)
504 list_add_tail(&default_measurement_rules[i].list,
505 &ima_default_rules);
506 default:
507 break;
508 }
509
510 /*
511 * Insert the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules requiring file
512 * signatures, prior to any other appraise rules.
513 */
514 for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++) {
515 list_add_tail(&secure_boot_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
516 temp_ima_appraise |=
517 ima_appraise_flag(secure_boot_rules[i].func);
518 }
519
520 /*
521 * Insert the build time appraise rules requiring file signatures
522 * for both the initial and custom policies, prior to other appraise
523 * rules.
524 */
525 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(build_appraise_rules); i++) {
526 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
527
528 if (!secure_boot_entries)
529 list_add_tail(&build_appraise_rules[i].list,
530 &ima_default_rules);
531
532 entry = kmemdup(&build_appraise_rules[i], sizeof(*entry),
533 GFP_KERNEL);
534 if (entry)
535 list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules);
536 build_ima_appraise |=
537 ima_appraise_flag(build_appraise_rules[i].func);
538 }
539
540 for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) {
541 list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list,
542 &ima_default_rules);
543 if (default_appraise_rules[i].func == POLICY_CHECK)
544 temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
545 }
546
547 ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
548 ima_update_policy_flag();
549 }
550
551 /* Make sure we have a valid policy, at least containing some rules. */
ima_check_policy(void)552 int ima_check_policy(void)
553 {
554 if (list_empty(&ima_temp_rules))
555 return -EINVAL;
556 return 0;
557 }
558
559 /**
560 * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules
561 *
562 * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new
563 * policy. What we do here is to splice ima_policy_rules and ima_temp_rules so
564 * they make a queue. The policy may be updated multiple times and this is the
565 * RCU updater.
566 *
567 * Policy rules are never deleted so ima_policy_flag gets zeroed only once when
568 * we switch from the default policy to user defined.
569 */
ima_update_policy(void)570 void ima_update_policy(void)
571 {
572 struct list_head *policy = &ima_policy_rules;
573
574 list_splice_tail_init_rcu(&ima_temp_rules, policy, synchronize_rcu);
575
576 if (ima_rules != policy) {
577 ima_policy_flag = 0;
578 ima_rules = policy;
579 }
580 ima_update_policy_flag();
581 }
582
583 enum {
584 Opt_err = -1,
585 Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure,
586 Opt_appraise, Opt_dont_appraise,
587 Opt_audit, Opt_hash, Opt_dont_hash,
588 Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
589 Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
590 Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_fsname,
591 Opt_fsuuid, Opt_uid_eq, Opt_euid_eq, Opt_fowner_eq,
592 Opt_uid_gt, Opt_euid_gt, Opt_fowner_gt,
593 Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt,
594 Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio,
595 Opt_pcr
596 };
597
598 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
599 {Opt_measure, "measure"},
600 {Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"},
601 {Opt_appraise, "appraise"},
602 {Opt_dont_appraise, "dont_appraise"},
603 {Opt_audit, "audit"},
604 {Opt_hash, "hash"},
605 {Opt_dont_hash, "dont_hash"},
606 {Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"},
607 {Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"},
608 {Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"},
609 {Opt_subj_user, "subj_user=%s"},
610 {Opt_subj_role, "subj_role=%s"},
611 {Opt_subj_type, "subj_type=%s"},
612 {Opt_func, "func=%s"},
613 {Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
614 {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
615 {Opt_fsname, "fsname=%s"},
616 {Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"},
617 {Opt_uid_eq, "uid=%s"},
618 {Opt_euid_eq, "euid=%s"},
619 {Opt_fowner_eq, "fowner=%s"},
620 {Opt_uid_gt, "uid>%s"},
621 {Opt_euid_gt, "euid>%s"},
622 {Opt_fowner_gt, "fowner>%s"},
623 {Opt_uid_lt, "uid<%s"},
624 {Opt_euid_lt, "euid<%s"},
625 {Opt_fowner_lt, "fowner<%s"},
626 {Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
627 {Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
628 {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
629 {Opt_err, NULL}
630 };
631
ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry * entry,substring_t * args,int lsm_rule,int audit_type)632 static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
633 substring_t *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
634 {
635 int result;
636
637 if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
638 return -EINVAL;
639
640 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = match_strdup(args);
641 if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p)
642 return -ENOMEM;
643
644 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
645 result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
646 Audit_equal,
647 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
648 &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
649 if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
650 kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
651 return -EINVAL;
652 }
653
654 return result;
655 }
656
ima_log_string_op(struct audit_buffer * ab,char * key,char * value,bool (* rule_operator)(kuid_t,kuid_t))657 static void ima_log_string_op(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value,
658 bool (*rule_operator)(kuid_t, kuid_t))
659 {
660 if (!ab)
661 return;
662
663 if (rule_operator == &uid_gt)
664 audit_log_format(ab, "%s>", key);
665 else if (rule_operator == &uid_lt)
666 audit_log_format(ab, "%s<", key);
667 else
668 audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key);
669 audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", value);
670 }
ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer * ab,char * key,char * value)671 static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
672 {
673 ima_log_string_op(ab, key, value, NULL);
674 }
675
ima_parse_rule(char * rule,struct ima_rule_entry * entry)676 static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
677 {
678 struct audit_buffer *ab;
679 char *from;
680 char *p;
681 bool uid_token;
682 int result = 0;
683
684 ab = integrity_audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
685 AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE);
686
687 entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
688 entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
689 entry->uid_op = &uid_eq;
690 entry->fowner_op = &uid_eq;
691 entry->action = UNKNOWN;
692 while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
693 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
694 int token;
695 unsigned long lnum;
696
697 if (result < 0)
698 break;
699 if ((*p == '\0') || (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t'))
700 continue;
701 token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args);
702 switch (token) {
703 case Opt_measure:
704 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "measure");
705
706 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
707 result = -EINVAL;
708
709 entry->action = MEASURE;
710 break;
711 case Opt_dont_measure:
712 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_measure");
713
714 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
715 result = -EINVAL;
716
717 entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
718 break;
719 case Opt_appraise:
720 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "appraise");
721
722 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
723 result = -EINVAL;
724
725 entry->action = APPRAISE;
726 break;
727 case Opt_dont_appraise:
728 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_appraise");
729
730 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
731 result = -EINVAL;
732
733 entry->action = DONT_APPRAISE;
734 break;
735 case Opt_audit:
736 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "audit");
737
738 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
739 result = -EINVAL;
740
741 entry->action = AUDIT;
742 break;
743 case Opt_hash:
744 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "hash");
745
746 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
747 result = -EINVAL;
748
749 entry->action = HASH;
750 break;
751 case Opt_dont_hash:
752 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_hash");
753
754 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
755 result = -EINVAL;
756
757 entry->action = DONT_HASH;
758 break;
759 case Opt_func:
760 ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from);
761
762 if (entry->func)
763 result = -EINVAL;
764
765 if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
766 entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
767 /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
768 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
769 entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
770 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MODULE_CHECK") == 0)
771 entry->func = MODULE_CHECK;
772 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FIRMWARE_CHECK") == 0)
773 entry->func = FIRMWARE_CHECK;
774 else if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
775 || (strcmp(args[0].from, "MMAP_CHECK") == 0))
776 entry->func = MMAP_CHECK;
777 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
778 entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
779 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "CREDS_CHECK") == 0)
780 entry->func = CREDS_CHECK;
781 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK") ==
782 0)
783 entry->func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK;
784 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK")
785 == 0)
786 entry->func = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK;
787 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "POLICY_CHECK") == 0)
788 entry->func = POLICY_CHECK;
789 else
790 result = -EINVAL;
791 if (!result)
792 entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC;
793 break;
794 case Opt_mask:
795 ima_log_string(ab, "mask", args[0].from);
796
797 if (entry->mask)
798 result = -EINVAL;
799
800 from = args[0].from;
801 if (*from == '^')
802 from++;
803
804 if ((strcmp(from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
805 entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
806 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
807 entry->mask = MAY_WRITE;
808 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
809 entry->mask = MAY_READ;
810 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
811 entry->mask = MAY_APPEND;
812 else
813 result = -EINVAL;
814 if (!result)
815 entry->flags |= (*args[0].from == '^')
816 ? IMA_INMASK : IMA_MASK;
817 break;
818 case Opt_fsmagic:
819 ima_log_string(ab, "fsmagic", args[0].from);
820
821 if (entry->fsmagic) {
822 result = -EINVAL;
823 break;
824 }
825
826 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &entry->fsmagic);
827 if (!result)
828 entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
829 break;
830 case Opt_fsname:
831 ima_log_string(ab, "fsname", args[0].from);
832
833 entry->fsname = kstrdup(args[0].from, GFP_KERNEL);
834 if (!entry->fsname) {
835 result = -ENOMEM;
836 break;
837 }
838 result = 0;
839 entry->flags |= IMA_FSNAME;
840 break;
841 case Opt_fsuuid:
842 ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
843
844 if (!uuid_is_null(&entry->fsuuid)) {
845 result = -EINVAL;
846 break;
847 }
848
849 result = uuid_parse(args[0].from, &entry->fsuuid);
850 if (!result)
851 entry->flags |= IMA_FSUUID;
852 break;
853 case Opt_uid_gt:
854 case Opt_euid_gt:
855 entry->uid_op = &uid_gt;
856 case Opt_uid_lt:
857 case Opt_euid_lt:
858 if ((token == Opt_uid_lt) || (token == Opt_euid_lt))
859 entry->uid_op = &uid_lt;
860 case Opt_uid_eq:
861 case Opt_euid_eq:
862 uid_token = (token == Opt_uid_eq) ||
863 (token == Opt_uid_gt) ||
864 (token == Opt_uid_lt);
865
866 ima_log_string_op(ab, uid_token ? "uid" : "euid",
867 args[0].from, entry->uid_op);
868
869 if (uid_valid(entry->uid)) {
870 result = -EINVAL;
871 break;
872 }
873
874 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
875 if (!result) {
876 entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(),
877 (uid_t) lnum);
878 if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) ||
879 (uid_t)lnum != lnum)
880 result = -EINVAL;
881 else
882 entry->flags |= uid_token
883 ? IMA_UID : IMA_EUID;
884 }
885 break;
886 case Opt_fowner_gt:
887 entry->fowner_op = &uid_gt;
888 case Opt_fowner_lt:
889 if (token == Opt_fowner_lt)
890 entry->fowner_op = &uid_lt;
891 case Opt_fowner_eq:
892 ima_log_string_op(ab, "fowner", args[0].from,
893 entry->fowner_op);
894
895 if (uid_valid(entry->fowner)) {
896 result = -EINVAL;
897 break;
898 }
899
900 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
901 if (!result) {
902 entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
903 if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
904 result = -EINVAL;
905 else
906 entry->flags |= IMA_FOWNER;
907 }
908 break;
909 case Opt_obj_user:
910 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
911 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
912 LSM_OBJ_USER,
913 AUDIT_OBJ_USER);
914 break;
915 case Opt_obj_role:
916 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_role", args[0].from);
917 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
918 LSM_OBJ_ROLE,
919 AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE);
920 break;
921 case Opt_obj_type:
922 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_type", args[0].from);
923 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
924 LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
925 AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE);
926 break;
927 case Opt_subj_user:
928 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_user", args[0].from);
929 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
930 LSM_SUBJ_USER,
931 AUDIT_SUBJ_USER);
932 break;
933 case Opt_subj_role:
934 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_role", args[0].from);
935 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
936 LSM_SUBJ_ROLE,
937 AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE);
938 break;
939 case Opt_subj_type:
940 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_type", args[0].from);
941 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
942 LSM_SUBJ_TYPE,
943 AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
944 break;
945 case Opt_appraise_type:
946 if (entry->action != APPRAISE) {
947 result = -EINVAL;
948 break;
949 }
950
951 ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from);
952 if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0)
953 entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
954 else
955 result = -EINVAL;
956 break;
957 case Opt_permit_directio:
958 entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;
959 break;
960 case Opt_pcr:
961 if (entry->action != MEASURE) {
962 result = -EINVAL;
963 break;
964 }
965 ima_log_string(ab, "pcr", args[0].from);
966
967 result = kstrtoint(args[0].from, 10, &entry->pcr);
968 if (result || INVALID_PCR(entry->pcr))
969 result = -EINVAL;
970 else
971 entry->flags |= IMA_PCR;
972
973 break;
974 case Opt_err:
975 ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
976 result = -EINVAL;
977 break;
978 }
979 }
980 if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN))
981 result = -EINVAL;
982 else if (entry->action == APPRAISE)
983 temp_ima_appraise |= ima_appraise_flag(entry->func);
984
985 audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
986 audit_log_end(ab);
987 return result;
988 }
989
990 /**
991 * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules
992 * @rule - ima measurement policy rule
993 *
994 * Avoid locking by allowing just one writer at a time in ima_write_policy()
995 * Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure
996 */
ima_parse_add_rule(char * rule)997 ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
998 {
999 static const char op[] = "update_policy";
1000 char *p;
1001 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
1002 ssize_t result, len;
1003 int audit_info = 0;
1004
1005 p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
1006 len = strlen(p) + 1;
1007 p += strspn(p, " \t");
1008
1009 if (*p == '#' || *p == '\0')
1010 return len;
1011
1012 entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
1013 if (!entry) {
1014 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
1015 NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info);
1016 return -ENOMEM;
1017 }
1018
1019 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
1020
1021 result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
1022 if (result) {
1023 kfree(entry);
1024 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
1025 NULL, op, "invalid-policy", result,
1026 audit_info);
1027 return result;
1028 }
1029
1030 list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_temp_rules);
1031
1032 return len;
1033 }
1034
1035 /**
1036 * ima_delete_rules() called to cleanup invalid in-flight policy.
1037 * We don't need locking as we operate on the temp list, which is
1038 * different from the active one. There is also only one user of
1039 * ima_delete_rules() at a time.
1040 */
ima_delete_rules(void)1041 void ima_delete_rules(void)
1042 {
1043 struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
1044 int i;
1045
1046 temp_ima_appraise = 0;
1047 list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_temp_rules, list) {
1048 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
1049 kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1050
1051 list_del(&entry->list);
1052 kfree(entry);
1053 }
1054 }
1055
1056 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
1057 enum {
1058 mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append
1059 };
1060
1061 static const char *const mask_tokens[] = {
1062 "MAY_EXEC",
1063 "MAY_WRITE",
1064 "MAY_READ",
1065 "MAY_APPEND"
1066 };
1067
1068 #define __ima_hook_stringify(str) (#str),
1069
1070 static const char *const func_tokens[] = {
1071 __ima_hooks(__ima_hook_stringify)
1072 };
1073
ima_policy_start(struct seq_file * m,loff_t * pos)1074 void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
1075 {
1076 loff_t l = *pos;
1077 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
1078
1079 rcu_read_lock();
1080 list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
1081 if (!l--) {
1082 rcu_read_unlock();
1083 return entry;
1084 }
1085 }
1086 rcu_read_unlock();
1087 return NULL;
1088 }
1089
ima_policy_next(struct seq_file * m,void * v,loff_t * pos)1090 void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
1091 {
1092 struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v;
1093
1094 rcu_read_lock();
1095 entry = list_entry_rcu(entry->list.next, struct ima_rule_entry, list);
1096 rcu_read_unlock();
1097 (*pos)++;
1098
1099 return (&entry->list == ima_rules) ? NULL : entry;
1100 }
1101
ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file * m,void * v)1102 void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
1103 {
1104 }
1105
1106 #define pt(token) policy_tokens[token + Opt_err].pattern
1107 #define mt(token) mask_tokens[token]
1108
1109 /*
1110 * policy_func_show - display the ima_hooks policy rule
1111 */
policy_func_show(struct seq_file * m,enum ima_hooks func)1112 static void policy_func_show(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_hooks func)
1113 {
1114 if (func > 0 && func < MAX_CHECK)
1115 seq_printf(m, "func=%s ", func_tokens[func]);
1116 else
1117 seq_printf(m, "func=%d ", func);
1118 }
1119
ima_policy_show(struct seq_file * m,void * v)1120 int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
1121 {
1122 struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v;
1123 int i;
1124 char tbuf[64] = {0,};
1125
1126 rcu_read_lock();
1127
1128 if (entry->action & MEASURE)
1129 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_measure));
1130 if (entry->action & DONT_MEASURE)
1131 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_measure));
1132 if (entry->action & APPRAISE)
1133 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_appraise));
1134 if (entry->action & DONT_APPRAISE)
1135 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_appraise));
1136 if (entry->action & AUDIT)
1137 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_audit));
1138 if (entry->action & HASH)
1139 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_hash));
1140 if (entry->action & DONT_HASH)
1141 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_hash));
1142
1143 seq_puts(m, " ");
1144
1145 if (entry->flags & IMA_FUNC)
1146 policy_func_show(m, entry->func);
1147
1148 if (entry->flags & IMA_MASK) {
1149 if (entry->mask & MAY_EXEC)
1150 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_exec));
1151 if (entry->mask & MAY_WRITE)
1152 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_write));
1153 if (entry->mask & MAY_READ)
1154 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_read));
1155 if (entry->mask & MAY_APPEND)
1156 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_append));
1157 seq_puts(m, " ");
1158 }
1159
1160 if (entry->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) {
1161 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "0x%lx", entry->fsmagic);
1162 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fsmagic), tbuf);
1163 seq_puts(m, " ");
1164 }
1165
1166 if (entry->flags & IMA_FSNAME) {
1167 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%s", entry->fsname);
1168 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fsname), tbuf);
1169 seq_puts(m, " ");
1170 }
1171
1172 if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) {
1173 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr);
1174 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf);
1175 seq_puts(m, " ");
1176 }
1177
1178 if (entry->flags & IMA_FSUUID) {
1179 seq_printf(m, "fsuuid=%pU", &entry->fsuuid);
1180 seq_puts(m, " ");
1181 }
1182
1183 if (entry->flags & IMA_UID) {
1184 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid));
1185 if (entry->uid_op == &uid_gt)
1186 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid_gt), tbuf);
1187 else if (entry->uid_op == &uid_lt)
1188 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid_lt), tbuf);
1189 else
1190 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid_eq), tbuf);
1191 seq_puts(m, " ");
1192 }
1193
1194 if (entry->flags & IMA_EUID) {
1195 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid));
1196 if (entry->uid_op == &uid_gt)
1197 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid_gt), tbuf);
1198 else if (entry->uid_op == &uid_lt)
1199 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid_lt), tbuf);
1200 else
1201 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid_eq), tbuf);
1202 seq_puts(m, " ");
1203 }
1204
1205 if (entry->flags & IMA_FOWNER) {
1206 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->fowner));
1207 if (entry->fowner_op == &uid_gt)
1208 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner_gt), tbuf);
1209 else if (entry->fowner_op == &uid_lt)
1210 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner_lt), tbuf);
1211 else
1212 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner_eq), tbuf);
1213 seq_puts(m, " ");
1214 }
1215
1216 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
1217 if (entry->lsm[i].rule) {
1218 switch (i) {
1219 case LSM_OBJ_USER:
1220 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_user),
1221 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1222 break;
1223 case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
1224 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_role),
1225 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1226 break;
1227 case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
1228 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_type),
1229 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1230 break;
1231 case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
1232 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_user),
1233 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1234 break;
1235 case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
1236 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_role),
1237 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1238 break;
1239 case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
1240 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_type),
1241 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1242 break;
1243 }
1244 }
1245 }
1246 if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED)
1247 seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig ");
1248 if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
1249 seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
1250 rcu_read_unlock();
1251 seq_puts(m, "\n");
1252 return 0;
1253 }
1254 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */
1255
