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Searched refs:hardlink (Results 1 – 4 of 4) sorted by relevance

/Linux-v5.15/fs/overlayfs/
Ddir.c183 if (attr->hardlink) { in ovl_create_real()
184 err = ovl_do_link(attr->hardlink, dir, newdentry); in ovl_create_real()
262 struct dentry *newdentry, bool hardlink) in ovl_instantiate() argument
274 if (!hardlink) { in ovl_instantiate()
305 if (hardlink) in ovl_instantiate()
330 if (!attr->hardlink && !IS_POSIXACL(udir)) in ovl_create_upper()
349 err = ovl_instantiate(dentry, inode, newdentry, !!attr->hardlink); in ovl_create_upper()
472 bool hardlink = !!cattr->hardlink; in ovl_create_over_whiteout() local
477 if (!hardlink) { in ovl_create_over_whiteout()
506 if (!hardlink && in ovl_create_over_whiteout()
[all …]
Doverlayfs.h568 struct dentry *hardlink; member
/Linux-v5.15/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/
Dfs.rst222 A long-standing class of security issues is the hardlink-based
225 is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given hardlink (i.e. a
226 root process follows a hardlink created by another user). Additionally,
231 When set to "0", hardlink creation behavior is unrestricted.
/Linux-v5.15/fs/
Dio_uring.c854 struct io_hardlink hardlink; member
3872 struct io_hardlink *lnk = &req->hardlink; in io_linkat_prep()
3904 struct io_hardlink *lnk = &req->hardlink; in io_linkat()
6614 putname(req->hardlink.oldpath); in io_clean_op()
6615 putname(req->hardlink.newpath); in io_clean_op()