| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/platform/ext/target/cypress/psoc64/ |
| D | tfm_hal_isolation.c | 101 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
110 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
112 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
137 partition_attrs = ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
149 bool privileged = !!((uint32_t)boundary & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
153 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/platform/ext/target/arm/mps2/an519/ |
| D | tfm_hal_isolation.c | 164 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
177 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
179 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
212 if (privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
225 if (!privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
242 partition_attrs = ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
256 bool privileged = !!((uint32_t)boundary & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
260 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/platform/ext/target/arm/corstone1000/ |
| D | tfm_hal_isolation.c | 243 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
252 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
254 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
258 partition_attrs = ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
276 bool privileged = !!(local_handle & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
280 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/platform/ext/target/arm/musca_s1/ |
| D | tfm_hal_isolation.c | 172 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
185 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
187 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
222 if (privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
235 if (!privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
252 partition_attrs = ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
266 bool privileged = !!(((uint32_t)boundary) & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
270 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/platform/ext/target/nuvoton/common/ |
| D | tfm_hal_isolation.c | 265 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
279 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
281 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
314 if (privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
327 if (!privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
363 partition_attrs |= ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
378 bool privileged = !!(local_handle & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
389 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
402 if (privileged) { in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/platform/ext/common/ |
| D | tfm_hal_isolation_v8m.c | 282 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
299 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
301 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
336 if (privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
349 if (!privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
398 partition_attrs = ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
412 bool privileged = !!((uint32_t)boundary & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
416 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/platform/ext/target/arm/musca_b1/ |
| D | tfm_hal_isolation.c | 277 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
291 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
293 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
326 if (privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
340 if (!privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
376 partition_attrs |= ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
391 bool privileged = !!(local_handle & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
402 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
415 if (privileged) { in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/platform/ext/target/stm/common/stm32l5xx/secure/ |
| D | tfm_hal_isolation.c | 269 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
283 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
285 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
318 if (!privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
354 partition_attrs |= ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
369 bool privileged = !!(local_handle & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
380 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
393 if (privileged) { in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/platform/ext/target/stm/common/stm32u5xx/secure/ |
| D | tfm_hal_isolation.c | 360 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
374 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
376 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
409 if (!privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
425 partition_attrs = ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
440 bool privileged = !!(local_handle & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
444 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/platform/ext/target/nxp/common/ |
| D | tfm_hal_isolation.c | 337 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
352 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
354 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
383 ppc_configure_to_secure(plat_data_ptr, privileged); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
389 if (!privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
425 partition_attrs |= ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
440 bool privileged = !!(local_handle & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
452 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
465 if (privileged) { in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
640 void ppc_configure_to_secure(struct platform_data_t *platform_data, bool privileged) in ppc_configure_to_secure() argument
[all …]
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| D | target_cfg_common.h | 65 void ppc_configure_to_secure(struct platform_data_t *platform_data, bool privileged);
|
| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/platform/ext/target/stm/common/stm32h5xx/secure/ |
| D | tfm_hal_isolation.c | 420 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
434 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
436 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
469 if (!privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
485 partition_attrs = ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
500 bool privileged = !!(local_handle & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
504 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
|
| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/platform/ext/target/arm/mps2/an521/ |
| D | tfm_hal_isolation.c | 392 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
410 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
412 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
452 if (privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
473 if (!privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
510 partition_attrs |= ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
525 bool privileged = !!(local_handle & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
540 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
553 if (privileged) { in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/docs/security/security_advisories/ |
| D | stack_seal_vulnerability.rst | 78 As described in the white paper, de-privileged interrupt handling is
79 also vulnerable to this problem. The Library mode of TF-M uses de-privileged
81 secure interrupt handling. But if the de-privileged handler makes a
86 part of de-privileged interrupt handling mitigates this vulnerability.
89 and does not use de-privileged interrupt handling mechanism. The PSA signal
99 (either via underflow of MSP_S or from top of MSP_S stack in de-privileged
104 of MSP_S before handing control over to de-privileged interrupt handler.
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/platform/ext/target/nordic_nrf/common/core/ |
| D | tfm_hal_isolation.c | 78 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
83 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
85 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
89 partition_attrs = ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
134 if (!privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
|
| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/docs/releases/ |
| D | 1.5.0.rst | 93 * - | Armclang 6.17 generates STRBT instead of STRB in privileged code.
94 | MemManage fault occurs when the privileged code calls STRBT to access
95 | a memory location only for privileged access.
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/platform/ext/common/armclang/ |
| D | tfm_common_s.sct | 159 * regions, unprivileged data sections and privileged data sections are
160 * separated and gathered in unprivileged/privileged data area respectively.
163 * privileged data region on Armv6-M/v7-M cores.
231 * Move BL2 shared area and MSP stack to the beginning of privileged data
|
| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/lib/ext/ethos_u_core_driver/ |
| D | 001-Remove-malloc-usage.patch | 40 - dev->privileged = privilege_enable;
|
| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/platform/ext/common/iar/ |
| D | tfm_common_s.icf | 183 * Move BL2 shared area and MSP stack to the beginning of privileged data
317 * regions, unprivileged data sections and privileged data sections are
318 * separated and gathered in unprivileged/privileged data area respectively.
321 * privileged data region on Armv6-M/v7-M cores.
364 * Move BL2 shared area and MSP stack to the beginning of privileged data
|
| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/platform/ext/common/gcc/ |
| D | tfm_common_s.ld | 301 * regions, unprivileged data sections and privileged data sections are
302 * separated and gathered in unprivileged/privileged data area respectively.
305 * privileged data region on Armv6-M/v7-M cores.
408 * Move BL2 shared area and MSP stack to the beginning of privileged data
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/docs/design_docs/dual-cpu/ |
| D | tfm_multi_core_access_check.rst | 57 - Unprivileged secure access should not access privileged secure memory region
107 if (Not in privileged level) {
157 check may skip the privileged/unprivileged permission check for non-secure
160 If a multi-core system enforces the privileged/unprivileged isolation and
274 memory region allows privileged read/write. Both the fields are valid only
|
| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/docs/integration_guide/services/ |
| D | tfm_platform_integration_guide.rst | 107 run in privileged mode in level 3 is not in place due to an ongoing work in
|
| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/docs/ |
| D | glossary.rst | 125 ARMv7M assembly instruction to call a privileged handler function
|
| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/platform/ext/target/arm/mps4/corstone315/device/source/ |
| D | platform_s_device_definition.c | 571 .privileged = 0,
|
| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/platform/ext/target/arm/mps3/corstone310/common/device/source/ |
| D | platform_s_device_definition.c | 573 .privileged = 0,
|
