| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/docs/design_docs/booting/ |
| D | tfm_secure_boot.rst | 48 It authenticates the firmware image by hash (SHA-256) and digital signature
50 into the bootloader image or can be provisioned to the SoC during manufacturing.
51 Metadata of the image is delivered together with the image itself in a header
53 execution to the secure image. Execution never returns to bootloader until
69 (multiple image boot) or together (single image boot). In case of multiple image
71 separately. In case of single image boot the secure and non-secure image is
76 concatenated. In case of single image boot they are concatenated first and then
77 signed. In case of multiple image boot they are separately signed first and then
91 Secure + Non-Secure image;
93 - 0x0008_0000 - 0x0008_03FF: Common image header
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| D | secure_boot_rollback_protection.rst | 20 - Manifest data: Metadata of the software image: size, version, hash,
22 - Software image: binary data, elf, etc.
24 Validation of new image
26 Boot loader is responsible to authenticate the new image according to the
27 required policies and decide whether the new image is fulfilling all the
28 requirements. Boot loader verifies the image integrity (hash calculation) and
30 well. If the new image is successfully authenticated then the boot loader is in
32 new image to be executed. During the validation process the image and the
39 - Image header: Prepended to the beginning of the image.
41 - TLV section: Appended to the end of the image. It is not integrity protected:
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| D | secure_boot_hw_key_integration.rst | 18 requires compile time built-in public key(s) for image verification. This
31 public key(s) must be available when MCUBoot image is built. There is a script
34 structure. The script is also capable of signing the image with the private key.
35 In order to identify and validate the corresponding public key during image
36 verification the hash of the public key is appended to the image manifest area
37 (TLV encoded metadata). During image verification the bootloader retrieves the
40 validates the public key which must be used for image verification.
68 - The corresponding public key for image verification must be identifiable and
79 the device, because it must be available during image verification. This
83 appended to the image itself in the manifest area. It has the drawback that the
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| D | bl1.rst | 47 - This allows for the fixing of any bugs in the BL2 image.
52 boot stage image.
84 mitigate the costs associated with changing ROM code, as a new BL1_2 image can
86 minimal codebase responsible mainly for the verification of the BL1_2 image.
95 5) BL1_2 copies the primary BL2 image from flash into RAM
96 6) BL1_2 verifies the BL2 image using asymmetric cryptography
97 7) If verification fails, BL1_2 repeats 5 and 6 with the secondary BL2 image
98 8) BL1_2 jumps to BL2, if either image has successfully verified
101 The BL1_2 image is not encrypted, so if it is placed in untrusted flash it
102 will be possible to read the data in the image.
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/bl2/ext/mcuboot/ |
| D | mcuboot_default_config.cmake | 15 …EA_NUM 0 CACHE STRING "ID of the flash area containing the primary Secure image")
16 …NUM 1 CACHE STRING "ID of the flash area containing the primary Non-Secure image")
18 … 2 CACHE STRING "Whether to combine S and NS into either 1 image, or sign each sepe…
19 … 1 CACHE STRING "Slot from which to execute the image, used for XIP mode…
21 …N CACHE BOOL "Whether to embed the entire public key in the image metadata instead o…
22 …L "Use builtin key(s) for validation, no public key data is embedded into the image metadata")
26 … 1 CACHE STRING "align option for mcuboot and build image with imgtool [1, 2…
27 set(MCUBOOT_CONFIRM_IMAGE OFF CACHE BOOL "Whether to confirm the image i…
40 set(MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES OFF CACHE BOOL "Enable encrypted image upgrade…
42 set(MCUBOOT_ENCRYPT_RSA OFF CACHE BOOL "Use RSA for encrypted image up…
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| D | Kconfig | 27 int "ID of the flash area containing the primary Secure image"
30 ID of the flash area containing the primary Secure image
33 int "ID of the flash area containing the primary Non-Secure image"
37 int "Whether to combine S and NS into either 1 image, or sign each seperately"
42 int "Slot from which to execute the image, used for XIP mode"
57 Whether to embed the entire public key in the image metadata instead of
64 No public key data is in the image metadata or boot code, key IDs
109 prompt "Align option for mcuboot and build image with imgtool"
134 bool "Whether to confirm the image if REVERT is supported in MCUboot"
146 bool "Enable encrypted image upgrade support"
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/docs/design_docs/services/ |
| D | tfm_fwu_service.rst | 23 - Image preparation: prepare a new firmware image in the component's firmware store.
50 …| | It maitains the image state context and calls the image ID | …
117 The component is in READY state. Prepare the staging area of the component for image download.
124 If the manifest is bundled with the firmware image, manifest must be NULL.
140 Load the image into the target component.
145 - ``image_offset``: The offset of the image being passed into block, in bytes.
146 - ``block``: A buffer containing a block of image data. This might be a complete image or a subset.
160 Check the authenticity and integrity of the image. If a reboot is required to
161 complete the check, then mark this image as a candidate so that the next time
162 bootloader runs it will take this image as a candidate one to bootup. Return
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/bl1/bl1_2/ |
| D | main.c | 44 static void collect_boot_measurement(const struct bl1_2_image_t *image) in collect_boot_measurement() argument
52 image->protected_values.version.major, in collect_boot_measurement()
53 image->protected_values.version.minor, in collect_boot_measurement()
54 image->protected_values.version.revision, in collect_boot_measurement()
55 image->protected_values.version.build_num, in collect_boot_measurement()
146 fih_int validate_image_at_addr(struct bl1_2_image_t *image) in validate_image_at_addr() argument
151 FIH_CALL(is_image_signature_valid, fih_rc, image); in validate_image_at_addr()
156 FIH_CALL(is_image_security_counter_valid, fih_rc, image); in validate_image_at_addr()
164 image->protected_values.security_counter); in validate_image_at_addr()
243 struct bl1_2_image_t *image; in validate_image() local
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/platform/ext/target/arm/rse/common/bringup_helpers/ |
| D | rse_bl1_2_image_otp_or_flash.c | 20 fih_int bl1_read_bl1_2_image(uint8_t *image) in bl1_read_bl1_2_image() argument
33 plat_err = tfm_plat_otp_read(PLAT_OTP_ID_BL1_2_IMAGE, bl1_2_len, image); in bl1_read_bl1_2_image()
39 image, in bl1_read_bl1_2_image()
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/platform/ext/target/arm/rse/common/bl2/ |
| D | create_xip_tables.py | 45 image = in_file.read() variable
61 image = struct_pack([image], round_up(len(image), sic_page_size)) variable
67 for chunk in chunk_bytes(image, sic_line_size):
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/lib/ext/cryptocell-312-runtime/utils/src/cc3x_boot_cert/examples/content_cert/ |
| D | sb_cnt_cert.cfg | 15 … Text file containing the list of authenticated SW image files. Each line refers to a single ima…
16 # <image file name> <mem load addr> <flash store addr><code encode flag>
19 # aes-ce-id = SW image encryption type: 0 = none; 1 = Kceicv; 2 = Kce.
20 …ographic verification and decryption mode: 0 = do Hash on plain image; 1 = do Hash on cipher image.
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| D | sb_cnt_cert_verify_flash.cfg | 15 … Text file containing the list of authenticated SW image files. Each line refers to a single ima…
16 # <image file name> <mem load addr> <flash store addr><code encode flag>
19 # aes-ce-id = SW image encryption type: 0 = none; 1 = Kceicv; 2 = Kce.
20 …ographic verification and decryption mode: 0 = do Hash on plain image; 1 = do Hash on cipher image.
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| D | sb_cnt_cert_verify_mem.cfg | 15 … Text file containing the list of authenticated SW image files. Each line refers to a single ima…
16 # <image file name> <mem load addr> <flash store addr><code encode flag>
19 # aes-ce-id = SW image encryption type: 0 = none; 1 = Kceicv; 2 = Kce.
20 …hic verification and decryption mode: 0 = do Hash on plain image; 1 = do Hash on cipher image.<cod…
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| D | sb_cnt_cert_enc_0.cfg | 15 … Text file containing the list of authenticated SW image files. Each line refers to a single ima…
16 # <image file name> <mem load addr> <flash store addr><code encode flag>
19 # aes-ce-id = SW image encryption type: 0 = none; 1 = Kceicv; 2 = Kce.
20 …ographic verification and decryption mode: 0 = do Hash on plain image; 1 = do Hash on cipher image.
|
| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/docs/integration_guide/source_structure/ |
| D | platform_ext_folder.rst | 209 address where the scratch area starts, which is used during image swapping.
217 - Required definitions in case of 1 image (S and NS images are concatenated
221 where the primary image area starts, which hosts the active firmware
222 image.
223 - ``FLASH_AREA_0_SIZE`` - Defines the size of the primary image area.
225 where the secondary image area starts, which is a placeholder for new
227 - ``FLASH_AREA_2_SIZE`` - Defines the size of the secondary image area.
233 where the primary image areas start, which host the active firmware
234 images. It is also the offset of the primary (active) secure image area.
235 - ``FLASH_AREA_0_SIZE`` - Defines the size of the primary secure image area.
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/docs/platform/cypress/psoc64/security/keys/ |
| D | readme.rst | 5 - TFM_S_KEY.json - private OEM key for signing CM0P image
6 - TFM_S_KEY_PRIV.pem - private OEM key for signing CM0P image in PEM format
7 - TFM_NS_KEY.json - private OEM key for signing CM4 image
8 - TFM_NS_KEY_PRIV.pem - private OEM key for signing CM4 image in PEM format
|
| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/docs/platform/arm/rse/ |
| D | readme.rst | 42 sign images in the required format. To sign a host image using the development
61 will load the image. RSE FW expects the first host image to be loaded to address
63 subsequent host image to be loaded at an offset of ``0x1000000`` from the
64 previous image. The RSE ATU should be configured to map these logical addresses
79 To run the built images, first the ROM image must be created from the bl1_1
87 Then, the flash image must be created by concatenating the images that are
88 output from the build. To create the flash image, the following ``fiptool``
97 --align 8192 --rss-scp-bl1 <signed Host SCP BL1 image> \
98 --align 8192 --rss-ap-bl1 <signed Host AP BL1 image> \
109 create the flash image::
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/bl1/bl1_1/lib/ |
| D | image_flash.c | 17 fih_int bl1_read_bl1_2_image(uint8_t *image) in bl1_read_bl1_2_image() argument
24 image, in bl1_read_bl1_2_image()
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| D | image_otp.c | 13 fih_int bl1_read_bl1_2_image(uint8_t *image) in bl1_read_bl1_2_image() argument
26 plat_err = tfm_plat_otp_read(PLAT_OTP_ID_BL1_2_IMAGE, bl1_2_len, image); in bl1_read_bl1_2_image()
|
| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/bl1/bl1_1/scripts/ |
| D | create_bl1_2_img.py | 47 image = struct_pack([bl1_2_code], pad_to=bl1_2_partition_size) variable
48 hash = hash_binary_blob(image)
51 img_out_file.write(image)
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/docs/platform/cypress/psoc64/ |
| D | cypress_psoc64_spec.rst | 204 Private OEM key for signing CM0P image
207 Private OEM key for signing CM0P image in PEM format
210 Private OEM key for signing CM4 image
213 Private OEM key for signing CM4 image in PEM format
245 SPE image:
252 sign-image \
254 --image-type BOOT \
255 --image-id 1
257 NSPE image:
264 sign-image \
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/platform/ext/target/nordic_nrf/common/core/ns/ |
| D | CMakeLists.txt | 46 # already required for any image that runs on a nrf device.
76 # We don't need to trim the device in the non-secure image because it
77 # is the secure image's responsiblity to do this.
79 # The glitch detector can only be configured from a secure image so
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| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/platform/ext/target/stm/b_u585i_iot02a/ |
| D | config.cmake | 13 … 2 CACHE STRING "Whether to combine S and NS into either 1 image, or sign each sepe…
15 set(MCUBOOT_ALIGN_VAL 16 CACHE STRING "Align option to build image wi…
18 set(MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES ON CACHE BOOL "Enable encrypted image upgrade…
19 set(MCUBOOT_ENCRYPT_RSA ON CACHE BOOL "Use RSA for encrypted image up…
|
| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/docs/platform/ |
| D | platform_introduction.rst | 9 - `FPGA image loaded on MPS3 board (AN555).
14 - `FPGA image loaded on MPS3 board (AN547).
16 - `FPGA image loaded on MPS3 board (AN552).
24 - `FPGA image loaded on MPS2 board (AN521).
32 - `FPGA image loaded on MPS3 board (AN524).
53 - `FPGA image loaded on MPS2 board (AN519).
|
| /trusted-firmware-m-3.7.0/docs/security/security_advisories/ |
| D | fwu_write_vulnerability.rst | 35 * \brief Writes an image to its staging area.
37 * Writes the image data 'block' with length 'block_size' to its staging area.
39 * \param[in] image_id The identifier of the image
42 * \param[in] block A buffer containing a block of image data. This
43 * might be a complete image or a subset.
|
