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Searched refs:privileged (Results 1 – 25 of 30) sorted by relevance

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/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/platform/ext/target/cypress/psoc64/
Dtfm_hal_isolation.c96 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
106 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
108 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
134 partition_attrs = ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
148 bool privileged = !!((uint32_t)boundary & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
152 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/platform/ext/target/arm/mps2/an519/
Dtfm_hal_isolation.c164 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
177 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
179 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
212 if (privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
225 if (!privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
242 partition_attrs = ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
256 bool privileged = !!((uint32_t)boundary & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
260 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/platform/ext/target/arm/rss/common/
Dtfm_hal_isolation.c187 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
200 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
202 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
235 if (privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
248 if (!privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
268 partition_attrs = ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
282 bool privileged = !!((uint32_t)boundary & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
286 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/platform/ext/target/arm/corstone1000/
Dtfm_hal_isolation.c170 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
179 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
181 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
185 partition_attrs = ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
203 bool privileged = !!(local_handle & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
207 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/platform/ext/target/arm/musca_s1/
Dtfm_hal_isolation.c172 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
185 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
187 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
222 if (privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
235 if (!privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
252 partition_attrs = ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
266 bool privileged = !!(((uint32_t)boundary) & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
270 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/platform/ext/target/nuvoton/common/
Dtfm_hal_isolation.c258 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
272 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
274 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
307 if (privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
320 if (!privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
356 partition_attrs |= ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
371 bool privileged = !!(local_handle & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
381 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
390 if (privileged) { in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/platform/ext/common/
Dtfm_hal_isolation_v8m.c277 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
294 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
296 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
331 if (privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
344 if (!privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
385 partition_attrs = ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
399 bool privileged = !!((uint32_t)boundary & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
403 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/platform/ext/target/arm/musca_b1/
Dtfm_hal_isolation.c270 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
284 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
286 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
319 if (privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
333 if (!privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
369 partition_attrs |= ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
384 bool privileged = !!(local_handle & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
394 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
403 if (privileged) { in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/platform/ext/target/stm/common/stm32u5xx/secure/
Dtfm_hal_isolation.c358 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
372 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
374 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
407 if (!privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
423 partition_attrs = ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
438 bool privileged = !!(local_handle & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
442 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/platform/ext/target/stm/common/stm32l5xx/secure/
Dtfm_hal_isolation.c261 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
275 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
277 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
310 if (!privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
346 partition_attrs |= ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
361 bool privileged = !!(local_handle & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
371 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
380 if (privileged) { in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/platform/ext/target/nxp/common/
Dtfm_hal_isolation.c303 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
317 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
319 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
347 plat_data_ptr->periph_ppc_loc, privileged); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
353 if (!privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
387 partition_attrs |= ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
401 bool privileged = !!(local_handle & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
410 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
417 if (privileged) { in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/platform/ext/target/arm/mps2/an521/
Dtfm_hal_isolation.c382 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
400 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
402 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
442 if (privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
463 if (!privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
500 partition_attrs |= ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
515 bool privileged = !!(local_handle & HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_MASK); in tfm_hal_activate_boundary() local
529 ctrl.b.nPRIV = privileged ? 0 : 1; in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
538 if (privileged) { in tfm_hal_activate_boundary()
/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/docs/security/security_advisories/
Dstack_seal_vulnerability.rst78 As described in the white paper, de-privileged interrupt handling is
79 also vulnerable to this problem. The Library mode of TF-M uses de-privileged
81 secure interrupt handling. But if the de-privileged handler makes a
86 part of de-privileged interrupt handling mitigates this vulnerability.
89 and does not use de-privileged interrupt handling mechanism. The PSA signal
99 (either via underflow of MSP_S or from top of MSP_S stack in de-privileged
104 of MSP_S before handing control over to de-privileged interrupt handler.
/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/platform/ext/target/nordic_nrf/common/core/
Dtfm_hal_isolation.c78 bool privileged; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary() local
83 privileged = true; in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
85 privileged = IS_PSA_ROT(p_ldinf); in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
89 partition_attrs = ((uint32_t)privileged << HANDLE_ATTR_PRIV_POS) & in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
133 if (!privileged) { in tfm_hal_bind_boundary()
/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/platform/ext/target/nxp/lpcxpresso55s69/
Dtarget_cfg.h79 void ppc_configure_to_secure(volatile uint32_t *bank, uint32_t pos, bool privileged);
Dtarget_cfg.c542 void ppc_configure_to_secure(volatile uint32_t *bank, uint32_t pos, bool privileged) in ppc_configure_to_secure() argument
553 *bank = (*bank) | (((privileged == true)?0x3:0x2) << (pos)); in ppc_configure_to_secure()
/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/docs/releases/
D1.5.0.rst93 * - | Armclang 6.17 generates STRBT instead of STRB in privileged code.
94 | MemManage fault occurs when the privileged code calls STRBT to access
95 | a memory location only for privileged access.
/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/platform/ext/common/armclang/
Dtfm_common_s.sct146 * regions, unprivileged data sections and privileged data sections are
147 * separated and gathered in unprivileged/privileged data area respectively.
150 * privileged data region on Armv6-M/v7-M cores.
212 * Move BL2 shared area and MSP stack to the beginning of privileged data
/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/platform/ext/common/iar/
Dtfm_common_s.icf168 * Move BL2 shared area and MSP stack to the beginning of privileged data
299 * regions, unprivileged data sections and privileged data sections are
300 * separated and gathered in unprivileged/privileged data area respectively.
303 * privileged data region on Armv6-M/v7-M cores.
345 * Move BL2 shared area and MSP stack to the beginning of privileged data
/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/platform/ext/common/gcc/
Dtfm_common_s.ld243 * regions, unprivileged data sections and privileged data sections are
244 * separated and gathered in unprivileged/privileged data area respectively.
247 * privileged data region on Armv6-M/v7-M cores.
348 * Move BL2 shared area and MSP stack to the beginning of privileged data
/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/docs/design_docs/dual-cpu/
Dtfm_multi_core_access_check.rst57 - Unprivileged secure access should not access privileged secure memory region
107 if (Not in privileged level) {
157 check may skip the privileged/unprivileged permission check for non-secure
160 If a multi-core system enforces the privileged/unprivileged isolation and
274 memory region allows privileged read/write. Both the fields are valid only
/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/docs/integration_guide/services/
Dtfm_platform_integration_guide.rst107 run in privileged mode in level 3 is not in place due to an ongoing work in
/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/docs/
Dglossary.rst125 ARMv7M assembly instruction to call a privileged handler function
/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/docs/design_docs/
Dtfm_log_system_design_document.rst202 outputting especially when SPM and SP run under different privileged level,
/trusted-firmware-m-3.5.0/docs/design_docs/services/
Dsecure_partition_runtime_library.rst201 Due to specified API (printf, e.g.) need to access privileged resources, TF-M
219 - It requires privileged permission to *access* special registers such

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