Searched refs:MAC (Results 1 – 22 of 22) sorted by relevance
45 MAC: HMAC-MD549 MAC: HMAC-RIPEMD16053 MAC: HMAC-SHA-157 MAC: HMAC-SHA-22461 MAC: HMAC-SHA-25665 MAC: HMAC-SHA-38469 MAC: HMAC-SHA-51273 MAC: CBC_MAC-AES-12877 MAC: CBC_MAC-AES-19281 MAC: CBC_MAC-AES-256[all …]
64 /* Change any one byte of the plaintext or MAC. The MAC will be wrong. */78 /* Shorter input buffer. Either the MAC will be wrong, or there isn't79 * enough room for a MAC. */129 * of padding and MAC.218 * Prepare a pre-encryption record (with MAC and padding), and save it.254 /* Corrupt one byte of the data (could be plaintext, MAC or padding) */272 * (and before that, than the buffer minus the size of the MAC), to make
66 // manual comparison against expected MAC69 // use psa_mac_verify to compare to expected MAC73 // corrupt the MAC and check that psa_mac_verify fails
506 PSA MAC sign multipart, through driver: HMAC-SHA-224, parts: 0510 PSA MAC sign multipart, through driver: HMAC-SHA-224, parts: 1514 PSA MAC sign multipart, through driver: HMAC-SHA-224, parts: 2518 PSA MAC sign multipart, through driver: HMAC-SHA-224, parts: 3522 PSA MAC sign, through driver: HMAC-SHA-224526 PSA MAC sign, fallback: HMAC-SHA-224530 PSA MAC sign, driver reports error: RFC4231 Test case 1 - HMAC-SHA-224534 PSA MAC sign, through driver: CMAC-AES-128538 PSA MAC sign, fallback: CMAC-AES-128542 PSA MAC sign, driver reports error: CMAC-AES-128[all …]
804 PSA key policy: MAC, SIGN_HASH -> SIGN_HASH+MESSAGE808 PSA key policy: MAC, VERIFY_HASH -> VERIFY_HASH+MESSAGE812 PSA key policy: MAC, SIGN+VERIFY_HASH -> {SIGN,VERIFY}_{HASH,MESSAGE}816 PSA key policy: MAC, {SIGN,VERIFY}_{HASH,MESSAGE}820 PSA key policy: MAC, SIGN_MESSAGE824 PSA key policy: MAC, VERIFY_MESSAGE828 PSA key policy: MAC, SIGN+VERIFY_MESSAGE832 PSA key policy: MAC, neither sign nor verify836 PSA key policy: MAC, wrong algorithm840 PSA key policy: MAC, alg=0 in policy[all …]
598 * \brief Internal Function for MAC multipart tests.1544 /* Check that the length for a truncated MAC always fits in the algorithm2195 /* Calculate the MAC, one-shot case. */2203 /* Calculate the MAC, multi-part case. */2220 /* Verify correct MAC, one-shot case. */2230 /* Verify correct MAC, multi-part case. */3466 /* A freshly-initialized MAC operation should not be usable. */3477 /* A default MAC operation should be abortable without error. */3737 /* Calculate the MAC, one-shot case. */3751 /* Calculate the MAC, multi-part case. */[all …]
1818 * Calculate the MAC, one-shot case.1893 * Calculate the MAC, multipart case.2002 * Verify the MAC, one-shot case.2058 * Verify the MAC, multi-part case.
269 MAC = 3 variable in AlgorithmCategory343 'HMAC': AlgorithmCategory.MAC,366 CATEGORY_FROM_HEAD[x] = AlgorithmCategory.MAC549 elif self.category == AlgorithmCategory.MAC:
778 … RLOC16 | Timeout | Age | LQ In | C_VN |R|D|N|Ver|CSL|QMsgCnt|Suprvsn| Extended MAC |1182 - RLOC16, extended MAC address1302 | J | Network Name | Extended PAN | PAN | MAC Address | Ch | dBm | LQI |2014 - d: MAC Data.2015 - r: MAC Data Request.2016 - a: MAC Ack.2237 - Extended MAC address2364 - Extended MAC address2372 - Error rates, frame tx (at MAC layer), IPv6 message tx (above MAC)2423 - Extended MAC address[all …]
96 See “[Cipher key management](#cipher-key-management)”, “[MAC key management](#mac-key-management)”,…119 | `cmac.h` | `mbedtls_cipher_cmac_` | [Hashes and MAC](#hashes-and-mac), [MAC calculation](#mac-cal…138 | `md.h` | `mbedtls_md_` | [Hashes and MAC](#hashes-and-mac) |139 | `md5.h` | `mbedtls_md5_` | [Hashes and MAC](#hashes-and-mac) |155 | `ripemd160.h` | `mbedtls_ripemd160_` | [Hashes and MAC](#hashes-and-mac) |157 | `sha1.h` | `mbedtls_sha1_` | [Hashes and MAC](#hashes-and-mac) |158 | `sha3.h` | `mbedtls_sha3_` | [Hashes and MAC](#hashes-and-mac) |159 | `sha256.h` | `mbedtls_sha256_` | [Hashes and MAC](#hashes-and-mac) |160 | `sha512.h` | `mbedtls_sha512_` | [Hashes and MAC](#hashes-and-mac) |262 …MAC with a reference value, use `psa_mac_verify` rather than `psa_mac_compute` followed by `mbedtl…[all …]
47 …sm with an encrypt-and-MAC structure. The authenticated encryption implementation separately calcu…50 … ciphertext before the client changes the output buffer and calculates the MAC after that change, …164 * The output of a hash or MAC operation.170 Message inputs to hash, MAC and key derivation operations are at a low risk of [read-read inconsist…219 * The output of a hash or MAC operation.223 * Hash and MAC input.468 * MAC477 …required way. Fortunately, the only interfaces that need testing are hash, MAC, AEAD (testing over…506 Hash and MAC | Careful access | Careful access | Low risk of multiple-access as the input and outpu…
50 …are accelerators that are capable of verifying a MAC and those that are only capable of computing …
13 … including all Thread networking layers (IPv6, 6LoWPAN, IEEE 802.15.4 with MAC security, Mesh Link…
48 Some methods only make sense as a group (for example a driver that provides the MAC methods must pr…
337 …_CONFIG_MAC_CSL_REQUEST_AHEAD_US "set time ahead to deliver CSL frame from MAC to SubMac in micros…
98 ### MAC gap analysis219 ### MAC APIs
221 * How to obtain metadata about algorithms (e.g. hash/MAC/tag size, key size).
222 …MAC. Called by `psa_mac_compute()` and possibly `psa_mac_verify()`. To verify a mac with `psa_mac_…223 …MAC. Called by `psa_mac_verify()`. This entry point is mainly useful for drivers of secure element…
12 …erface defines a number of categories of cryptographic algorithms (hashes, MAC, signatures, etc.).…
1336 value when verifying a MAC or AEAD tag. This hardens the library in1414 * The key usage flags PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE now allows the MAC1416 * The key usage flags PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE now allows the MAC1827 (when the encrypt-then-MAC extension is not in use) with some ALT1963 * In the PSA API, the policy for a MAC or AEAD algorithm can specify a1964 minimum MAC or tag length thanks to the new wildcards2244 to extract and check the MAC. This is an improvement to the existing3108 padded records in case of CBC ciphersuites using Encrypt-then-MAC.3308 CBC based ciphersuite is used together with Encrypt-then-MAC. Previously,4657 * Add support for Encrypt-then-MAC (RFC 7366).[all …]
348 …to Driver A. For example Driver A does CCM, which calls driver B to do CBC-MAC, which in turn call…
2157 * MAC functions
