Searched refs:round (Results 1 – 6 of 6) sorted by relevance
| /hal_espressif-latest/components/bt/host/bluedroid/stack/smp/ |
| D | smp_cmac.c | 39 UINT16 round; member
142 while (i <= cmac_cb.round) { in cmac_aes_k_calculate()
143 smp_xor_128(&cmac_cb.text[(cmac_cb.round - i)*BT_OCTET16_LEN], x); /* Mi' := Mi (+) X */ in cmac_aes_k_calculate()
145 …if (!SMP_Encrypt(key, BT_OCTET16_LEN, &cmac_cb.text[(cmac_cb.round - i)*BT_OCTET16_LEN], BT_OCTET1… in cmac_aes_k_calculate()
189 SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("flag = %d round = %d", flag, cmac_cb.round); in cmac_prepare_last_block()
297 cmac_cb.round = n; in aes_cipher_msg_auth_code()
|
| D | smp_utils.c | 1403 UINT8 smp_calculate_random_input(UINT8 *random, UINT8 round) in smp_calculate_random_input() argument
1405 UINT8 i = round / 8; in smp_calculate_random_input()
1406 UINT8 j = round % 8; in smp_calculate_random_input()
1409 SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("random: 0x%02x, round: %d, i: %d, j: %d\n", random[i], round, i, j); in smp_calculate_random_input()
|
| D | smp_keys.c | 1217 random_input = smp_calculate_random_input(p_cb->local_random, p_cb->round); in smp_calculate_local_commitment()
1263 ri = smp_calculate_random_input(p_cb->peer_random, p_cb->round); in smp_calculate_peer_commitment()
2215 SMP_TRACE_DEBUG ("%s round %d", __FUNCTION__, p_cb->round); in smp_process_new_nonce()
|
| D | smp_act.c | 1741 if (++p_cb->round < 20) { in smp_process_peer_nonce()
1869 p_cb->round = 0; in smp_start_passkey_verification()
|
| /hal_espressif-latest/components/bt/host/bluedroid/stack/smp/include/ |
| D | smp_int.h | 312 UINT8 round; /* authentication stage 1 round for passkey association model */ member
490 extern UINT8 smp_calculate_random_input(UINT8 *random, UINT8 round);
|
| /hal_espressif-latest/components/efuse/esp32h2/ |
| D | esp_efuse_table.csv | 126 … EFUSE_BLK0, 62, 2, [] Set this bit to control the xts pseudo-round anti-dpa attack fu…
|
