1 /*
2 * Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange
3 *
4 * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
5 * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
6 *
7 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
8 * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
9 * You may obtain a copy of the License at
10 *
11 * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
12 *
13 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
14 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
15 * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
16 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
17 * limitations under the License.
18 *
19 * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
20 */
21 /*
22 * The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation
23 * of the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle algorithm:
24 *
25 * [1] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997, Chapter 12
26 * Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone
27 *
28 */
29
30 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
31 #include "mbedtls/config.h"
32 #else
33 #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
34 #endif
35
36 #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
37
38 #include "mbedtls/dhm.h"
39
40 #include <string.h>
41
42 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
43 #include "mbedtls/pem.h"
44 #endif
45
46 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
47 #include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
48 #endif
49
50 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
51 #include "mbedtls/platform.h"
52 #else
53 #include <stdlib.h>
54 #include <stdio.h>
55 #define mbedtls_printf printf
56 #define mbedtls_calloc calloc
57 #define mbedtls_free free
58 #endif
59
60 /* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */
mbedtls_zeroize(void * v,size_t n)61 static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) {
62 volatile unsigned char *p = v; while( n-- ) *p++ = 0;
63 }
64
65 /*
66 * helper to validate the mbedtls_mpi size and import it
67 */
dhm_read_bignum(mbedtls_mpi * X,unsigned char ** p,const unsigned char * end)68 static int dhm_read_bignum( mbedtls_mpi *X,
69 unsigned char **p,
70 const unsigned char *end )
71 {
72 int ret, n;
73
74 if( end - *p < 2 )
75 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
76
77 n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1];
78 (*p) += 2;
79
80 if( (int)( end - *p ) < n )
81 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
82
83 if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( X, *p, n ) ) != 0 )
84 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED + ret );
85
86 (*p) += n;
87
88 return( 0 );
89 }
90
91 /*
92 * Verify sanity of parameter with regards to P
93 *
94 * Parameter should be: 2 <= public_param <= P - 2
95 *
96 * For more information on the attack, see:
97 * http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/psandqs.pdf
98 * http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2005-2643
99 */
dhm_check_range(const mbedtls_mpi * param,const mbedtls_mpi * P)100 static int dhm_check_range( const mbedtls_mpi *param, const mbedtls_mpi *P )
101 {
102 mbedtls_mpi L, U;
103 int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
104
105 mbedtls_mpi_init( &L ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U );
106
107 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &L, 2 ) );
108 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &U, P, 2 ) );
109
110 if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( param, &L ) >= 0 &&
111 mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( param, &U ) <= 0 )
112 {
113 ret = 0;
114 }
115
116 cleanup:
117 mbedtls_mpi_free( &L ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &U );
118 return( ret );
119 }
120
mbedtls_dhm_init(mbedtls_dhm_context * ctx)121 void mbedtls_dhm_init( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx )
122 {
123 memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_dhm_context ) );
124 }
125
126 /*
127 * Parse the ServerKeyExchange parameters
128 */
mbedtls_dhm_read_params(mbedtls_dhm_context * ctx,unsigned char ** p,const unsigned char * end)129 int mbedtls_dhm_read_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
130 unsigned char **p,
131 const unsigned char *end )
132 {
133 int ret;
134
135 if( ( ret = dhm_read_bignum( &ctx->P, p, end ) ) != 0 ||
136 ( ret = dhm_read_bignum( &ctx->G, p, end ) ) != 0 ||
137 ( ret = dhm_read_bignum( &ctx->GY, p, end ) ) != 0 )
138 return( ret );
139
140 if( ( ret = dhm_check_range( &ctx->GY, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 )
141 return( ret );
142
143 ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P );
144
145 return( 0 );
146 }
147
148 /*
149 * Setup and write the ServerKeyExchange parameters
150 */
mbedtls_dhm_make_params(mbedtls_dhm_context * ctx,int x_size,unsigned char * output,size_t * olen,int (* f_rng)(void *,unsigned char *,size_t),void * p_rng)151 int mbedtls_dhm_make_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size,
152 unsigned char *output, size_t *olen,
153 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
154 void *p_rng )
155 {
156 int ret, count = 0;
157 size_t n1, n2, n3;
158 unsigned char *p;
159
160 if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) == 0 )
161 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
162
163 /*
164 * Generate X as large as possible ( < P )
165 */
166 do
167 {
168 mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->X, x_size, f_rng, p_rng );
169
170 while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->X, &ctx->P ) >= 0 )
171 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &ctx->X, 1 ) );
172
173 if( count++ > 10 )
174 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED );
175 }
176 while( dhm_check_range( &ctx->X, &ctx->P ) != 0 );
177
178 /*
179 * Calculate GX = G^X mod P
180 */
181 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->GX, &ctx->G, &ctx->X,
182 &ctx->P , &ctx->RP ) );
183
184 if( ( ret = dhm_check_range( &ctx->GX, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 )
185 return( ret );
186
187 /*
188 * export P, G, GX
189 */
190 #define DHM_MPI_EXPORT(X,n) \
191 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( X, p + 2, n ) ); \
192 *p++ = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 ); \
193 *p++ = (unsigned char)( n ); p += n;
194
195 n1 = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P );
196 n2 = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->G );
197 n3 = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->GX );
198
199 p = output;
200 DHM_MPI_EXPORT( &ctx->P , n1 );
201 DHM_MPI_EXPORT( &ctx->G , n2 );
202 DHM_MPI_EXPORT( &ctx->GX, n3 );
203
204 *olen = p - output;
205
206 ctx->len = n1;
207
208 cleanup:
209
210 if( ret != 0 )
211 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED + ret );
212
213 return( 0 );
214 }
215
216 /*
217 * Import the peer's public value G^Y
218 */
mbedtls_dhm_read_public(mbedtls_dhm_context * ctx,const unsigned char * input,size_t ilen)219 int mbedtls_dhm_read_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
220 const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen )
221 {
222 int ret;
223
224 if( ctx == NULL || ilen < 1 || ilen > ctx->len )
225 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
226
227 if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->GY, input, ilen ) ) != 0 )
228 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED + ret );
229
230 return( 0 );
231 }
232
233 /*
234 * Create own private value X and export G^X
235 */
mbedtls_dhm_make_public(mbedtls_dhm_context * ctx,int x_size,unsigned char * output,size_t olen,int (* f_rng)(void *,unsigned char *,size_t),void * p_rng)236 int mbedtls_dhm_make_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size,
237 unsigned char *output, size_t olen,
238 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
239 void *p_rng )
240 {
241 int ret, count = 0;
242
243 if( ctx == NULL || olen < 1 || olen > ctx->len )
244 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
245
246 if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) == 0 )
247 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
248
249 /*
250 * generate X and calculate GX = G^X mod P
251 */
252 do
253 {
254 mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->X, x_size, f_rng, p_rng );
255
256 while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->X, &ctx->P ) >= 0 )
257 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &ctx->X, 1 ) );
258
259 if( count++ > 10 )
260 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED );
261 }
262 while( dhm_check_range( &ctx->X, &ctx->P ) != 0 );
263
264 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->GX, &ctx->G, &ctx->X,
265 &ctx->P , &ctx->RP ) );
266
267 if( ( ret = dhm_check_range( &ctx->GX, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 )
268 return( ret );
269
270 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->GX, output, olen ) );
271
272 cleanup:
273
274 if( ret != 0 )
275 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED + ret );
276
277 return( 0 );
278 }
279
280 /*
281 * Use the blinding method and optimisation suggested in section 10 of:
282 * KOCHER, Paul C. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA,
283 * DSS, and other systems. In : Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO'96. Springer
284 * Berlin Heidelberg, 1996. p. 104-113.
285 */
dhm_update_blinding(mbedtls_dhm_context * ctx,int (* f_rng)(void *,unsigned char *,size_t),void * p_rng)286 static int dhm_update_blinding( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
287 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
288 {
289 int ret, count;
290
291 /*
292 * Don't use any blinding the first time a particular X is used,
293 * but remember it to use blinding next time.
294 */
295 if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->X, &ctx->pX ) != 0 )
296 {
297 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->pX, &ctx->X ) );
298 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &ctx->Vi, 1 ) );
299 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &ctx->Vf, 1 ) );
300
301 return( 0 );
302 }
303
304 /*
305 * Ok, we need blinding. Can we re-use existing values?
306 * If yes, just update them by squaring them.
307 */
308 if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Vi, 1 ) != 0 )
309 {
310 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi ) );
311 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->P ) );
312
313 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf ) );
314 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) );
315
316 return( 0 );
317 }
318
319 /*
320 * We need to generate blinding values from scratch
321 */
322
323 /* Vi = random( 2, P-1 ) */
324 count = 0;
325 do
326 {
327 mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->Vi, mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ), f_rng, p_rng );
328
329 while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->P ) >= 0 )
330 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &ctx->Vi, 1 ) );
331
332 if( count++ > 10 )
333 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE );
334 }
335 while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Vi, 1 ) <= 0 );
336
337 /* Vf = Vi^-X mod P */
338 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->P ) );
339 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->X, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) );
340
341 cleanup:
342 return( ret );
343 }
344
345 /*
346 * Derive and export the shared secret (G^Y)^X mod P
347 */
mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(mbedtls_dhm_context * ctx,unsigned char * output,size_t output_size,size_t * olen,int (* f_rng)(void *,unsigned char *,size_t),void * p_rng)348 int mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
349 unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, size_t *olen,
350 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
351 void *p_rng )
352 {
353 int ret;
354 mbedtls_mpi GYb;
355
356 if( ctx == NULL || output_size < ctx->len )
357 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
358
359 if( ( ret = dhm_check_range( &ctx->GY, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 )
360 return( ret );
361
362 mbedtls_mpi_init( &GYb );
363
364 /* Blind peer's value */
365 if( f_rng != NULL )
366 {
367 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( dhm_update_blinding( ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) );
368 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &GYb, &ctx->GY, &ctx->Vi ) );
369 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &GYb, &GYb, &ctx->P ) );
370 }
371 else
372 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &GYb, &ctx->GY ) );
373
374 /* Do modular exponentiation */
375 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->K, &GYb, &ctx->X,
376 &ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) );
377
378 /* Unblind secret value */
379 if( f_rng != NULL )
380 {
381 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->Vf ) );
382 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->P ) );
383 }
384
385 *olen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->K );
386
387 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->K, output, *olen ) );
388
389 cleanup:
390 mbedtls_mpi_free( &GYb );
391
392 if( ret != 0 )
393 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED + ret );
394
395 return( 0 );
396 }
397
398 /*
399 * Free the components of a DHM key
400 */
mbedtls_dhm_free(mbedtls_dhm_context * ctx)401 void mbedtls_dhm_free( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx )
402 {
403 mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->pX); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vf ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vi );
404 mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RP ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->K ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->GY );
405 mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->GX ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->G );
406 mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->P );
407
408 mbedtls_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_dhm_context ) );
409 }
410
411 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
412 /*
413 * Parse DHM parameters
414 */
mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm(mbedtls_dhm_context * dhm,const unsigned char * dhmin,size_t dhminlen)415 int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin,
416 size_t dhminlen )
417 {
418 int ret;
419 size_t len;
420 unsigned char *p, *end;
421 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
422 mbedtls_pem_context pem;
423
424 mbedtls_pem_init( &pem );
425
426 /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */
427 if( dhminlen == 0 || dhmin[dhminlen - 1] != '\0' )
428 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT;
429 else
430 ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem,
431 "-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----",
432 "-----END DH PARAMETERS-----",
433 dhmin, NULL, 0, &dhminlen );
434
435 if( ret == 0 )
436 {
437 /*
438 * Was PEM encoded
439 */
440 dhminlen = pem.buflen;
441 }
442 else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT )
443 goto exit;
444
445 p = ( ret == 0 ) ? pem.buf : (unsigned char *) dhmin;
446 #else
447 p = (unsigned char *) dhmin;
448 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */
449 end = p + dhminlen;
450
451 /*
452 * DHParams ::= SEQUENCE {
453 * prime INTEGER, -- P
454 * generator INTEGER, -- g
455 * privateValueLength INTEGER OPTIONAL
456 * }
457 */
458 if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
459 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
460 {
461 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT + ret;
462 goto exit;
463 }
464
465 end = p + len;
466
467 if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &dhm->P ) ) != 0 ||
468 ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &dhm->G ) ) != 0 )
469 {
470 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT + ret;
471 goto exit;
472 }
473
474 if( p != end )
475 {
476 /* This might be the optional privateValueLength.
477 * If so, we can cleanly discard it */
478 mbedtls_mpi rec;
479 mbedtls_mpi_init( &rec );
480 ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &rec );
481 mbedtls_mpi_free( &rec );
482 if ( ret != 0 )
483 {
484 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT + ret;
485 goto exit;
486 }
487 if ( p != end )
488 {
489 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT +
490 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
491 goto exit;
492 }
493 }
494
495 ret = 0;
496
497 dhm->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &dhm->P );
498
499 exit:
500 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
501 mbedtls_pem_free( &pem );
502 #endif
503 if( ret != 0 )
504 mbedtls_dhm_free( dhm );
505
506 return( ret );
507 }
508
509 #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
510 /*
511 * Load all data from a file into a given buffer.
512 *
513 * The file is expected to contain either PEM or DER encoded data.
514 * A terminating null byte is always appended. It is included in the announced
515 * length only if the data looks like it is PEM encoded.
516 */
load_file(const char * path,unsigned char ** buf,size_t * n)517 static int load_file( const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n )
518 {
519 FILE *f;
520 long size;
521
522 if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL )
523 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR );
524
525 fseek( f, 0, SEEK_END );
526 if( ( size = ftell( f ) ) == -1 )
527 {
528 fclose( f );
529 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR );
530 }
531 fseek( f, 0, SEEK_SET );
532
533 *n = (size_t) size;
534
535 if( *n + 1 == 0 ||
536 ( *buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, *n + 1 ) ) == NULL )
537 {
538 fclose( f );
539 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED );
540 }
541
542 if( fread( *buf, 1, *n, f ) != *n )
543 {
544 fclose( f );
545 mbedtls_free( *buf );
546 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR );
547 }
548
549 fclose( f );
550
551 (*buf)[*n] = '\0';
552
553 if( strstr( (const char *) *buf, "-----BEGIN " ) != NULL )
554 ++*n;
555
556 return( 0 );
557 }
558
559 /*
560 * Load and parse DHM parameters
561 */
mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile(mbedtls_dhm_context * dhm,const char * path)562 int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const char *path )
563 {
564 int ret;
565 size_t n;
566 unsigned char *buf;
567
568 if( ( ret = load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 )
569 return( ret );
570
571 ret = mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( dhm, buf, n );
572
573 mbedtls_zeroize( buf, n );
574 mbedtls_free( buf );
575
576 return( ret );
577 }
578 #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
579 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
580
581 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
582
583 static const char mbedtls_test_dhm_params[] =
584 "-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\r\n"
585 "MIGHAoGBAJ419DBEOgmQTzo5qXl5fQcN9TN455wkOL7052HzxxRVMyhYmwQcgJvh\r\n"
586 "1sa18fyfR9OiVEMYglOpkqVoGLN7qd5aQNNi5W7/C+VBdHTBJcGZJyyP5B3qcz32\r\n"
587 "9mLJKudlVudV0Qxk5qUJaPZ/xupz0NyoVpviuiBOI1gNi8ovSXWzAgEC\r\n"
588 "-----END DH PARAMETERS-----\r\n";
589
590 static const size_t mbedtls_test_dhm_params_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_dhm_params );
591
592 /*
593 * Checkup routine
594 */
mbedtls_dhm_self_test(int verbose)595 int mbedtls_dhm_self_test( int verbose )
596 {
597 int ret;
598 mbedtls_dhm_context dhm;
599
600 mbedtls_dhm_init( &dhm );
601
602 if( verbose != 0 )
603 mbedtls_printf( " DHM parameter load: " );
604
605 if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( &dhm,
606 (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_dhm_params,
607 mbedtls_test_dhm_params_len ) ) != 0 )
608 {
609 if( verbose != 0 )
610 mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
611
612 ret = 1;
613 goto exit;
614 }
615
616 if( verbose != 0 )
617 mbedtls_printf( "passed\n\n" );
618
619 exit:
620 mbedtls_dhm_free( &dhm );
621
622 return( ret );
623 }
624
625 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
626
627 #endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */
628
