Lines Matching refs:messages

127    * Fix issue of redefinition warning messages for _GNU_SOURCE in
137    * Fix psa_cipher_decrypt() with CCM* rejecting messages less than 3 bytes
465      the attacker to send a large number of messages for decryption. For
1051      1024 messages. As such, it is not intended for use in TLS, but instead
1383      potentially leading to corrupted alert messages being sent in case
2024      the affected side to wrongly reject valid messages. Fixes #4118.
2678      SSLv2 ClientHello messages.
3308    * Zeroize memory used for buffering or reassembling handshake messages
3370    * Add support for fragmentation of outgoing DTLS handshake messages. This
3379    * Add support for buffering out-of-order handshake messages in DTLS.
3423    * Add support for buffering of out-of-order handshake messages.
3433      partially recover the plaintext of messages under some conditions by
3435      this recovery by sending many messages in the same connection. With TLS
3447      plaintext of messages under some conditions by using a cache attack
3457      to partially recover the plaintext of messages under some conditions (see
3502    * Fix decryption for zero length messages (which contain all padding) when a
3517      zero-length messages when using TLS 1.2. Contributed by Espressif Systems.
3647      returned when unexpected messages were being discarded, ignoring that
3648      further messages could potentially already be pending to be processed
3934    * Fix handling of handshake messages in mbedtls_ssl_read() in case
4134      suppressing the CA list in Certificate Request messages. The default
4158    * Add checks to prevent signature forgeries for very large messages while
4169      CertificateVerify messages, to prevent SLOTH attacks against TLS 1.2.
4550    * Prepend a "thread identifier" to debug messages (issue pointed out by
4865    * Added new error codes and debug messages about selection of
4957      It was possible to crash the server (and client) using crafted messages
5026    * debug_set_threshold() added to ignore messages over threshold level
5086    * The length of various ClientKeyExchange messages was not properly checked.
5446      It was possible to crash the server (and client) using crafted messages
5594    * Debug messages about padding errors during SSL message decryption are
5596    * Sending of security-relevant alert messages that do not break
5745    * Debug messages about padding errors during SSL message decryption are
5795    * Fixed potential memory corruption on miscrafted client messages (found by