| /Linux-v5.4/drivers/media/radio/ |
| D | radio-trust.c | 51 struct trust { struct
58 struct trust *tr = kzalloc(sizeof(*tr), GFP_KERNEL); in trust_alloc() argument
73 static void write_i2c(struct trust *tr, int n, ...) in write_i2c()
121 struct trust *tr = container_of(isa, struct trust, isa); in trust_s_mute_volume()
131 struct trust *tr = container_of(isa, struct trust, isa); in trust_s_stereo()
149 struct trust *tr = container_of(isa, struct trust, isa); in trust_s_frequency()
166 struct trust *tr = container_of(isa, struct trust, isa); in trust_s_ctrl()
185 struct trust *tr = container_of(isa, struct trust, isa); in trust_initialize()
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| D | Makefile | 20 obj-$(CONFIG_RADIO_TRUST) += radio-trust.o
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| /Linux-v5.4/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/ |
| D | resource-control.rst | 8 enabled in a kernel for people who don't trust their users or their
14 memory user's they don't trust to play nice can use.
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| /Linux-v5.4/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/remoteproc/ |
| D | stm32-rproc.txt | 16 - st,syscfg-tz: Reference to the system configuration which holds the RCC trust
19 2nd cell: register offset containing the RCC trust zone mode setting
20 3rd cell: register bitmask for the RCC trust zone mode bit
|
| /Linux-v5.4/Documentation/x86/ |
| D | intel_txt.rst | 13 - Provides dynamic root of trust for measurement (DRTM)
34 http://www.trust-conference.eu/downloads/Keynote-Speakers/
67 To get trust in the initial kernel without using Intel TXT, a
68 static root of trust must be used. This bases trust in BIOS
81 By using the hardware-based root of trust that Intel TXT provides,
83 pre-launch components can be removed from the trust chain, DMA
91 almost all parts of the trust chain is available (excepting SMM and
101 processor instruction that initiates the dynamic root of trust.
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| D | topology.rst | 63 The logical ID of the package. As we do not trust BIOSes to enumerate the
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| D | mtrr.rst | 99 move the framebuffer base address, so the only value you can trust is
|
| /Linux-v5.4/include/linux/qed/ |
| D | qed_iov_if.h | 57 int (*set_trust) (struct qed_dev *cdev, int vfid, bool trust);
|
| /Linux-v5.4/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/ |
| D | bnxt_sriov.h | 37 int bnxt_set_vf_trust(struct net_device *dev, int vf_id, bool trust);
|
| D | bnxt_sriov.c | 977 bool trust = bnxt_is_trusted_vf(bp, vf); in bnxt_vf_configure_mac() local
980 (trust || !is_valid_ether_addr(vf->mac_addr) || in bnxt_vf_configure_mac()
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| /Linux-v5.4/Documentation/process/ |
| D | maintainer-pgp-guide.rst | 47 that trust must always be placed with developers and never with the code
52 want to make sure that by placing trust into developers we do not simply
179 - sign other people's keys for web of trust purposes
526 trust: ultimate validity: ultimate
844 delegated trust technologies, namely DNSSEC and TLS, to get you going if
876 PGP incorporates a trust delegation mechanism known as the "Web of
886 "the SSH-like approach to trust." With SSH, the first time you connect
890 trust the changed key or not. Similarly, the first time you import
896 We recommend that you use the combined TOFU+PGP trust model (which is
898 ``trust-model`` setting in ``~/.gnupg/gpg.conf``::
[all …]
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| D | management-style.rst | 95 deleting it, you may have irrevocably lost the trust of that
176 trust somebody who is so clearly hiding their true character.
236 It's part of what makes people trust you, and allow you the potential
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| D | 7.AdvancedTopics.rst | 125 to trust things *without* then having to go and check every
|
| /Linux-v5.4/tools/testing/selftests/rcutorture/bin/ |
| D | kvm.sh | 180 --trust-make)
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| /Linux-v5.4/Documentation/hwmon/ |
| D | lm63.rst | 75 is left to the BIOS, and the driver will blindly trust it. Only the original
|
| /Linux-v5.4/Documentation/usb/ |
| D | authorization.rst | 94 can fake descriptors and device info. Don't trust that. You are
|
| /Linux-v5.4/Documentation/ABI/testing/ |
| D | sysfs-class-cxl | 238 0 = don't trust, the image may be different (default)
239 1 = trust that the image will not change.
|
| /Linux-v5.4/Documentation/security/tpm/ |
| D | xen-tpmfront.rst | 21 the chain of trust rooted in the hardware TPM to virtual machines in Xen. Each
|
| /Linux-v5.4/Documentation/i2c/ |
| D | functionality.rst | 9 I2C specifications, a client can not trust that everything it needs
|
| /Linux-v5.4/drivers/char/tpm/ |
| D | Kconfig | 127 can be found at http://www.trust.rub.de/projects/linux-device-driver-infineon-tpm/
|
| /Linux-v5.4/Documentation/input/devices/ |
| D | iforce-protocol.rst | 17 from Immerse. That's why you should not trust what is written in this
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| /Linux-v5.4/Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/ |
| D | verity.rst | 196 be passed via the kernel command-line in a rooted chain of trust where
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| /Linux-v5.4/security/ |
| D | Kconfig | 113 correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
|
| /Linux-v5.4/Documentation/media/dvb-drivers/ |
| D | dvb-usb.rst | 330 Gunnar Wittich and Joachim von Caron for their trust for providing
|
| /Linux-v5.4/Documentation/ia64/ |
| D | mca.rst | 47 Because the MCA/INIT handlers cannot trust the kernel stack, they
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