| /Linux-v5.15/security/ |
| D | device_cgroup.c | 37 short access; member
106 walk->access |= ex->access; in dev_exception_add()
134 walk->access &= ~ex->access; in dev_exception_rm()
135 if (!walk->access) { in dev_exception_rm()
238 static void set_access(char *acc, short access) in set_access() argument
242 if (access & DEVCG_ACC_READ) in set_access()
244 if (access & DEVCG_ACC_WRITE) in set_access()
246 if (access & DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD) in set_access()
290 set_access(acc, ex->access); in devcgroup_seq_show()
316 u32 major, u32 minor, short access) in match_exception() argument
[all …]
|
| /Linux-v5.15/kernel/kcsan/ |
| D | kcsan_test.c | 144 } access[2]; member
151 const bool is_assert = (r->access[0].type | r->access[1].type) & KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT; in report_matches()
170 if (r->access[1].fn) { in report_matches()
175 scnprintf(tmp[0], sizeof(tmp[0]), "%pS", r->access[0].fn); in report_matches()
176 scnprintf(tmp[1], sizeof(tmp[1]), "%pS", r->access[1].fn); in report_matches()
179 cmp < 0 ? r->access[0].fn : r->access[1].fn, in report_matches()
180 cmp < 0 ? r->access[1].fn : r->access[0].fn); in report_matches()
182 scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "%pS", r->access[0].fn); in report_matches()
192 if (!r->access[1].fn) in report_matches()
197 const int ty = r->access[i].type; in report_matches()
[all …]
|
| /Linux-v5.15/sound/core/ |
| D | control_led.c | 49 unsigned int access; member
81 static inline unsigned int access_to_group(unsigned int access) in access_to_group() argument
83 return ((access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_LED_MASK) >> in access_to_group()
92 static struct snd_ctl_led *snd_ctl_led_get_by_access(unsigned int access) in snd_ctl_led_get_by_access() argument
94 unsigned int group = access_to_group(access); in snd_ctl_led_get_by_access()
137 static void snd_ctl_led_set_state(struct snd_card *card, unsigned int access, in snd_ctl_led_set_state() argument
145 led = snd_ctl_led_get_by_access(access); in snd_ctl_led_set_state()
165 lctl->access = access; in snd_ctl_led_set_state()
199 unsigned int access) in snd_ctl_led_remove() argument
206 if (lctl && (access == 0 || access != lctl->access)) { in snd_ctl_led_remove()
[all …]
|
| /Linux-v5.15/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ |
| D | Smack.rst | 10 Smack is a kernel based implementation of mandatory access
33 access to systems that use them as Smack does.
50 load the Smack access rules
53 report if a process with one label has access
85 Used to make access control decisions. In almost all cases
95 label does not allow all of the access permitted to a process
102 the Smack rule (more below) that permitted the write access
110 Use the Smack label in this attribute for access control
115 Use the Smack label in this attribute for access control
131 access
[all …]
|
| /Linux-v5.15/drivers/platform/chrome/ |
| D | cros_ec_lpc_mec.c | 79 enum cros_ec_lpc_mec_emi_access_mode access, new_access; in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec() local
91 access = ACCESS_TYPE_BYTE; in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
93 access = ACCESS_TYPE_LONG_AUTO_INCREMENT; in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
98 cros_ec_lpc_mec_emi_write_address(offset, access); in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
126 if (new_access != access || in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
127 access != ACCESS_TYPE_LONG_AUTO_INCREMENT) { in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
128 access = new_access; in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
129 cros_ec_lpc_mec_emi_write_address(offset, access); in cros_ec_lpc_io_bytes_mec()
|
| /Linux-v5.15/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ |
| D | fs_test.c | 401 __u64 access; in TEST_F_FORK() local
415 for (access = 1; access <= ACCESS_LAST; access <<= 1) { in TEST_F_FORK()
416 path_beneath.allowed_access = access; in TEST_F_FORK()
419 if ((access | ACCESS_FILE) == ACCESS_FILE) { in TEST_F_FORK()
452 __u64 access; member
485 add_path_beneath(_metadata, ruleset_fd, rules[i].access, in create_ruleset()
505 .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | in TEST_F_FORK()
511 const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, rules[0].access | in TEST_F_FORK()
552 .access = ACCESS_RO, in TEST_F_FORK()
575 .access = ACCESS_RO, in TEST_F_FORK()
[all …]
|
| /Linux-v5.15/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/engine/dma/ |
| D | user.c | 87 args->v0.version, args->v0.target, args->v0.access, in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
90 dmaobj->access = args->v0.access; in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
120 switch (dmaobj->access) { in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
122 dmaobj->access = NV_MEM_ACCESS_VM; in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
125 dmaobj->access = NV_MEM_ACCESS_RO; in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
128 dmaobj->access = NV_MEM_ACCESS_WO; in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
131 dmaobj->access = NV_MEM_ACCESS_RW; in nvkm_dmaobj_ctor()
|
| /Linux-v5.15/include/linux/ |
| D | device_cgroup.h | 16 short access);
19 short type, access = 0; in devcgroup_inode_permission() local
32 access |= DEVCG_ACC_WRITE; in devcgroup_inode_permission()
34 access |= DEVCG_ACC_READ; in devcgroup_inode_permission()
37 access); in devcgroup_inode_permission()
61 short access) in devcgroup_check_permission() argument
|
| /Linux-v5.15/arch/arm/include/asm/ |
| D | arch_timer.h | 27 void arch_timer_reg_write_cp15(int access, enum arch_timer_reg reg, u32 val) in arch_timer_reg_write_cp15() argument
29 if (access == ARCH_TIMER_PHYS_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_write_cp15()
38 } else if (access == ARCH_TIMER_VIRT_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_write_cp15()
53 u32 arch_timer_reg_read_cp15(int access, enum arch_timer_reg reg) in arch_timer_reg_read_cp15() argument
57 if (access == ARCH_TIMER_PHYS_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_read_cp15()
66 } else if (access == ARCH_TIMER_VIRT_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_read_cp15()
|
| /Linux-v5.15/fs/afs/ |
| D | security.c | 131 h += permits->permits[i].access; in afs_hash_permits()
168 if (permits->permits[i].access != caller_access) { in afs_cache_permit()
234 new->permits[j].access = caller_access; in afs_cache_permit()
238 new->permits[j].access = permits->permits[i].access; in afs_cache_permit()
245 new->permits[j].access = caller_access; in afs_cache_permit()
328 *_access = permits->permits[i].access; in afs_check_permit_rcu()
368 *_access = permits->permits[i].access; in afs_check_permit()
403 afs_access_t access; in afs_permission() local
417 !afs_check_permit_rcu(vnode, key, &access)) in afs_permission()
431 ret = afs_check_permit(vnode, key, &access); in afs_permission()
[all …]
|
| /Linux-v5.15/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/ |
| D | sja1105_dynamic_config.c | 886 .access = OP_WRITE,
894 .access = (OP_READ | OP_WRITE | OP_DEL),
902 .access = (OP_READ | OP_WRITE | OP_VALID_ANYWAY),
910 .access = (OP_WRITE | OP_DEL),
919 .access = OP_WRITE,
927 .access = OP_WRITE,
935 .access = OP_WRITE,
943 .access = OP_WRITE,
951 .access = (OP_WRITE | OP_DEL),
959 .access = OP_WRITE,
[all …]
|
| /Linux-v5.15/Documentation/core-api/ |
| D | unaligned-memory-access.rst | 14 when it comes to memory access. This document presents some details about
19 The definition of an unaligned access
26 access.
28 The above may seem a little vague, as memory access can happen in different
32 which will compile to multiple-byte memory access instructions, namely when
47 of memory access. However, we must consider ALL supported architectures;
52 Why unaligned access is bad
55 The effects of performing an unaligned memory access vary from architecture
62 happen. The exception handler is able to correct the unaligned access,
66 unaligned access to be corrected.
[all …]
|
| /Linux-v5.15/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/ |
| D | rxe_mw.c | 49 mw->access = 0; in rxe_do_dealloc_mw()
82 if (unlikely((mw->access & IB_ZERO_BASED))) { in rxe_check_bind_mw()
120 if (unlikely(mr->access & IB_ZERO_BASED)) { in rxe_check_bind_mw()
126 if (unlikely(!(mr->access & IB_ACCESS_MW_BIND))) { in rxe_check_bind_mw()
133 if (unlikely((mw->access & in rxe_check_bind_mw()
135 !(mr->access & IB_ACCESS_LOCAL_WRITE))) { in rxe_check_bind_mw()
142 if (mw->access & IB_ZERO_BASED) { in rxe_check_bind_mw()
171 mw->access = wqe->wr.wr.mw.access; in rxe_do_bind_mw()
276 mw->access = 0; in rxe_do_invalidate_mw()
315 struct rxe_mw *rxe_lookup_mw(struct rxe_qp *qp, int access, u32 rkey) in rxe_lookup_mw() argument
[all …]
|
| D | rxe_mr.c | 46 static void rxe_mr_init(int access, struct rxe_mr *mr) in rxe_mr_init() argument
49 u32 rkey = (access & IB_ACCESS_REMOTE) ? lkey : 0; in rxe_mr_init()
96 void rxe_mr_init_dma(struct rxe_pd *pd, int access, struct rxe_mr *mr) in rxe_mr_init_dma() argument
98 rxe_mr_init(access, mr); in rxe_mr_init_dma()
101 mr->access = access; in rxe_mr_init_dma()
107 int access, struct rxe_mr *mr) in rxe_mr_init_user() argument
118 umem = ib_umem_get(pd->ibpd.device, start, length, access); in rxe_mr_init_user()
128 rxe_mr_init(access, mr); in rxe_mr_init_user()
170 mr->access = access; in rxe_mr_init_user()
369 int access, in copy_data() argument
[all …]
|
| /Linux-v5.15/Documentation/arm/ |
| D | mem_alignment.rst | 5 Too many problems popped up because of unnoticed misaligned memory access in
14 unaligned memory access in general. If those access are predictable, you
16 alignment trap can fixup misaligned access for the exception cases, but at
20 trap to SIGBUS any code performing unaligned access (good for debugging bad
21 code), or even fixup the access by software like for kernel code. The later
36 0 A user process performing an unaligned memory access
42 performing the unaligned access. This is of course
47 performing the unaligned access.
59 information on unaligned access occurrences plus the current mode of
|
| /Linux-v5.15/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/ |
| D | dev_cgroup.c | 17 short access = ctx->access_type >> 16; in bpf_prog1() local
32 if (access & BPF_DEVCG_ACC_READ) in bpf_prog1()
35 if (access & BPF_DEVCG_ACC_WRITE) in bpf_prog1()
38 if (access & BPF_DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD) in bpf_prog1()
|
| /Linux-v5.15/tools/perf/Documentation/ |
| D | security.txt | 8 Enabling LSM based mandatory access control (MAC) to perf_event_open() syscall
11 LSM hooks for mandatory access control for perf_event_open() syscall can be
13 Targeted policy with perf_event_open() access control capabilities:
127 Opening access to perf_event_open() syscall on Fedora with SELinux
133 and prevent unauthorized access to perf_event_open() syscall. In such case
139 Enforced MAC policy settings (SELinux) can limit access to performance
141 more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy.
143 access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users
148 >= 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access
149 >= 1: Disallow CPU event access
[all …]
|
| /Linux-v5.15/arch/arm64/include/asm/ |
| D | arch_timer.h | 105 void arch_timer_reg_write_cp15(int access, enum arch_timer_reg reg, u32 val) in arch_timer_reg_write_cp15() argument
107 if (access == ARCH_TIMER_PHYS_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_write_cp15()
116 } else if (access == ARCH_TIMER_VIRT_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_write_cp15()
131 u32 arch_timer_reg_read_cp15(int access, enum arch_timer_reg reg) in arch_timer_reg_read_cp15() argument
133 if (access == ARCH_TIMER_PHYS_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_read_cp15()
140 } else if (access == ARCH_TIMER_VIRT_ACCESS) { in arch_timer_reg_read_cp15()
|
| /Linux-v5.15/drivers/hwmon/pmbus/ |
| D | zl6100.c | 25 ktime_t access; /* chip access time */ member
129 s64 delta = ktime_us_delta(ktime_get(), data->access); in zl6100_wait()
179 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_read_word_data()
228 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_read_byte_data()
270 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_write_word_data()
286 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_write_byte()
372 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_probe()
407 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_probe()
421 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_probe()
431 data->access = ktime_get(); in zl6100_probe()
[all …]
|
| D | max15301.c | 34 ktime_t access; /* Chip access time */ member
62 s64 delta = ktime_us_delta(ktime_get(), data->access); in max15301_wait()
84 data->access = ktime_get(); in max15301_read_word_data()
100 data->access = ktime_get(); in max15301_read_byte_data()
120 data->access = ktime_get(); in max15301_write_word_data()
136 data->access = ktime_get(); in max15301_write_byte()
|
| /Linux-v5.15/fs/nfsd/ |
| D | lockd.c | 32 int access; in nlm_fopen() local
41 access = (mode == O_WRONLY) ? NFSD_MAY_WRITE : NFSD_MAY_READ; in nlm_fopen()
42 access |= NFSD_MAY_LOCK; in nlm_fopen()
43 nfserr = nfsd_open(rqstp, &fh, S_IFREG, access, filp); in nlm_fopen()
|
| /Linux-v5.15/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/ |
| D | paging_tmpl.h | 104 static inline void FNAME(protect_clean_gpte)(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, unsigned *access, in FNAME()
119 *access &= mask; in FNAME()
219 unsigned access; in FNAME() local
221 access = ((gpte & VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK) ? ACC_WRITE_MASK : 0) | in FNAME()
227 access = gpte & (PT_WRITABLE_MASK | PT_USER_MASK | PT_PRESENT_MASK); in FNAME()
229 access ^= (gpte >> PT64_NX_SHIFT); in FNAME()
232 return access; in FNAME()
342 gpa_t addr, u32 access) in FNAME()
355 const int write_fault = access & PFERR_WRITE_MASK; in FNAME()
356 const int user_fault = access & PFERR_USER_MASK; in FNAME()
[all …]
|
| /Linux-v5.15/drivers/thermal/st/ |
| D | Kconfig | 13 tristate "STi series syscfg register access based thermal sensors"
17 tristate "STi series memory mapped access based thermal sensors"
25 SoCs. This thermal driver allows to access to general thermal framework
26 functionalities and to access to SoC sensor functionalities. This
|
| /Linux-v5.15/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/ |
| D | hash_64k.c | 36 int __hash_page_4K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid, in __hash_page_4K() argument
59 if (unlikely(!check_pte_access(access, old_pte))) in __hash_page_4K()
67 if (access & _PAGE_WRITE) in __hash_page_4K()
211 hash_failure_debug(ea, access, vsid, trap, ssize, in __hash_page_4K()
223 int __hash_page_64K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, in __hash_page_64K() argument
245 if (unlikely(!check_pte_access(access, old_pte))) in __hash_page_64K()
259 if (access & _PAGE_WRITE) in __hash_page_64K()
323 hash_failure_debug(ea, access, vsid, trap, ssize, in __hash_page_64K()
|
| /Linux-v5.15/Documentation/security/ |
| D | landlock.rst | 12 Landlock's goal is to create scoped access-control (i.e. sandboxing). To
20 system security policy enforced by other access control mechanisms (e.g. DAC,
21 LSM). Indeed, a Landlock rule shall not interfere with other access-controls
31 Guiding principles for safe access controls
34 * A Landlock rule shall be focused on access control on kernel objects instead
40 * Kernel access check shall not slow down access request from unsandboxed
73 grant access to an object, at least one rule of each layer must allow the
|
