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Searched refs:CAP_MAC_ADMIN (Results 1 – 7 of 7) sorted by relevance

/Linux-v4.19/security/smack/
Dsmackfs.c693 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) in smk_write_load()
879 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) in smk_set_cipso()
1176 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) in smk_write_net4addr()
1436 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) in smk_write_net6addr()
1607 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) in smk_write_doi()
1674 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) in smk_write_direct()
1752 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) in smk_write_mapped()
1844 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) in smk_write_ambient()
2015 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) in smk_write_onlycap()
2102 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) in smk_write_unconfined()
[all …]
Dsmack_lsm.c768 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { in smack_set_mnt_opts()
1332 if (check_priv && !smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) in smack_inode_setxattr()
1435 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) in smack_inode_removexattr()
3614 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel)) in smack_setprocattr()
3634 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { in smack_setprocattr()
/Linux-v4.19/include/uapi/linux/
Dcapability.h351 #define CAP_MAC_ADMIN 33 macro
/Linux-v4.19/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/
DSmack.rst79 name space. A process must have ``CAP_MAC_ADMIN`` to change any of these
124 reading ``/proc/self/attr/current``. A process with ``CAP_MAC_ADMIN``
282 This contains labels processes must have for CAP_MAC_ADMIN
311 a process with ``CAP_MAC_ADMIN`` can write a label into this interface.
321 if it has ``CAP_MAC_ADMIN``. This interface allows a process without
322 ``CAP_MAC_ADMIN`` to relabel itself to one of labels from predefined list.
323 A process without ``CAP_MAC_ADMIN`` can change its label only once. When it
619 A process with CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE or CAP_MAC_ADMIN is privileged.
621 be denied otherwise. CAP_MAC_ADMIN allows a process to change
/Linux-v4.19/Documentation/cgroup-v1/
Ddevices.txt44 CAP_MAC_ADMIN, since we really are trying to lock down root.
/Linux-v4.19/security/apparmor/
Dpolicy.c667 bool capable = ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN); in policy_admin_capable()
/Linux-v4.19/security/selinux/
Dhooks.c3245 if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit)) in has_cap_mac_admin()
3247 if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit, true)) in has_cap_mac_admin()