| /Linux-v6.6/drivers/gpu/drm/ci/ |
| D | container.yml | 24 rules:
28 rules:
32 rules:
36 rules:
40 rules:
44 rules:
48 rules:
52 rules:
56 rules:
60 rules:
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| D | gitlab-ci.yml | 84 - '/.gitlab-ci/farm-rules.yml'
113 .rules-anchors:
114 rules:
138 .scheduled_pipeline-rules:
139 rules:
145 .no_scheduled_pipelines-rules:
146 rules:
151 .build-rules:
152 rules:
153 - !reference [.no_scheduled_pipelines-rules, rules]
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| /Linux-v6.6/tools/perf/util/ |
| D | strfilter.h | 23 * @rules: Filter rule, which is a combination of glob expressions.
24 * @err: Pointer which points an error detected on @rules
26 * Parse @rules and return new strfilter. Return NULL if an error detected.
30 struct strfilter *strfilter__new(const char *rules, const char **err);
35 * @rules: Filter rule to be appended at left of the root of
37 * @err: Pointer which points an error detected on @rules
39 * Parse @rules and join it to the @filter by using logical-or.
43 const char *rules, const char **err);
48 * @rules: Filter rule to be appended at left of the root of
50 * @err: Pointer which points an error detected on @rules
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| D | strfilter.c | 160 struct strfilter *strfilter__new(const char *rules, const char **err) in strfilter__new() argument
166 filter->root = strfilter_node__new(rules, &ep); in strfilter__new()
179 const char *rules, const char **err) in strfilter__append() argument
184 if (!filter || !rules) in strfilter__append()
187 right = strfilter_node__new(rules, &ep); in strfilter__append()
207 int strfilter__or(struct strfilter *filter, const char *rules, const char **err) in strfilter__or() argument
209 return strfilter__append(filter, true, rules, err); in strfilter__or()
212 int strfilter__and(struct strfilter *filter, const char *rules, in strfilter__and() argument
215 return strfilter__append(filter, false, rules, err); in strfilter__and()
238 /* Return true if STR matches the filter rules */
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| /Linux-v6.6/security/apparmor/ |
| D | net.c | 111 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, in aa_profile_af_perm() local
112 typeof(*rules), list); in aa_profile_af_perm()
122 state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_NET); in aa_profile_af_perm()
128 state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &buffer, in aa_profile_af_perm()
130 perms = *aa_lookup_perms(&rules->policy, state); in aa_profile_af_perm()
221 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, in aa_secmark_perm() local
222 typeof(*rules), list); in aa_secmark_perm()
224 if (rules->secmark_count == 0) in aa_secmark_perm()
227 for (i = 0; i < rules->secmark_count; i++) { in aa_secmark_perm()
228 if (!rules->secmark[i].secid) { in aa_secmark_perm()
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| D | resource.c | 87 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, in profile_setrlimit() local
88 typeof(*rules), list); in profile_setrlimit()
91 if (rules->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) && new_rlim->rlim_max > in profile_setrlimit()
92 rules->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max) in profile_setrlimit()
121 * profiles. AppArmor rules currently have the implicit assumption in aa_task_setrlimit()
160 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&old->rules, in __aa_transition_rlimits() local
161 typeof(*rules), in __aa_transition_rlimits()
163 if (rules->rlimits.mask) { in __aa_transition_rlimits()
168 if (rules->rlimits.mask & mask) { in __aa_transition_rlimits()
180 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&new->rules, in __aa_transition_rlimits() local
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| D | policy_unpack.c | 565 static bool unpack_secmark(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_ruleset *rules) in unpack_secmark() argument
575 rules->secmark = kcalloc(size, sizeof(struct aa_secmark), in unpack_secmark()
577 if (!rules->secmark) in unpack_secmark()
580 rules->secmark_count = size; in unpack_secmark()
583 if (!unpack_u8(e, &rules->secmark[i].audit, NULL)) in unpack_secmark()
585 if (!unpack_u8(e, &rules->secmark[i].deny, NULL)) in unpack_secmark()
587 if (!aa_unpack_strdup(e, &rules->secmark[i].label, NULL)) in unpack_secmark()
599 if (rules->secmark) { in unpack_secmark()
601 kfree(rules->secmark[i].label); in unpack_secmark()
602 kfree(rules->secmark); in unpack_secmark()
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| D | capability.c | 67 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, in audit_caps() local
68 typeof(*rules), list); in audit_caps()
77 !cap_raised(rules->caps.audit, cap))) in audit_caps()
81 cap_raised(rules->caps.kill, cap)) { in audit_caps()
83 } else if (cap_raised(rules->caps.quiet, cap) && in audit_caps()
119 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, in profile_capable() local
120 typeof(*rules), list); in profile_capable()
123 if (cap_raised(rules->caps.allow, cap) && in profile_capable()
124 !cap_raised(rules->caps.denied, cap)) in profile_capable()
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| D | mount.c | 306 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, in match_mnt_path_str() local
307 typeof(*rules), list); in match_mnt_path_str()
314 if (!RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_MOUNT)) in match_mnt_path_str()
329 pos = do_match_mnt(&rules->policy, in match_mnt_path_str()
330 rules->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT], in match_mnt_path_str()
363 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, in match_mnt() local
364 typeof(*rules), list); in match_mnt()
370 if (!RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_MOUNT)) in match_mnt()
572 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, in profile_umount() local
573 typeof(*rules), list); in profile_umount()
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| D | ipc.c | 81 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, in profile_signal_perm() local
82 typeof(*rules), list); in profile_signal_perm()
87 !ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(&profile->rules, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL)) in profile_signal_perm()
92 state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy.dfa, in profile_signal_perm()
93 rules->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL], in profile_signal_perm()
95 aa_label_match(profile, rules, peer, state, false, request, &perms); in profile_signal_perm()
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| D | domain.c | 84 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, in match_component() local
85 typeof(*rules), list); in match_component()
89 state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, "&"); in match_component()
91 return aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, tp->base.hname); in match_component()
95 state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file.dfa, state, ":", 1); in match_component()
96 state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, ns_name); in match_component()
97 state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file.dfa, state, ":", 1); in match_component()
98 return aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, tp->base.hname); in match_component()
122 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, in label_compound_match() local
123 typeof(*rules), list); in label_compound_match()
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| D | policy.c | 10 * AppArmor policy is based around profiles, which contain the rules a
13 * visible set of profiles or by following a profiles attachment rules.
206 static void free_ruleset(struct aa_ruleset *rules) in free_ruleset() argument
210 aa_destroy_policydb(&rules->file); in free_ruleset()
211 aa_destroy_policydb(&rules->policy); in free_ruleset()
212 aa_free_cap_rules(&rules->caps); in free_ruleset()
213 aa_free_rlimit_rules(&rules->rlimits); in free_ruleset()
215 for (i = 0; i < rules->secmark_count; i++) in free_ruleset()
216 kfree_sensitive(rules->secmark[i].label); in free_ruleset()
217 kfree_sensitive(rules->secmark); in free_ruleset()
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| /Linux-v6.6/drivers/net/dsa/qca/ |
| D | qca8k-leds.c | 53 * 3 control rules for phy0-3 that applies to all their leds in qca8k_get_control_led_reg()
54 * 3 control rules for phy4 in qca8k_get_control_led_reg()
65 qca8k_parse_netdev(unsigned long rules, u32 *offload_trigger) in qca8k_parse_netdev() argument
68 if (test_bit(TRIGGER_NETDEV_TX, &rules)) in qca8k_parse_netdev()
70 if (test_bit(TRIGGER_NETDEV_RX, &rules)) in qca8k_parse_netdev()
72 if (test_bit(TRIGGER_NETDEV_LINK_10, &rules)) in qca8k_parse_netdev()
74 if (test_bit(TRIGGER_NETDEV_LINK_100, &rules)) in qca8k_parse_netdev()
76 if (test_bit(TRIGGER_NETDEV_LINK_1000, &rules)) in qca8k_parse_netdev()
78 if (test_bit(TRIGGER_NETDEV_HALF_DUPLEX, &rules)) in qca8k_parse_netdev()
80 if (test_bit(TRIGGER_NETDEV_FULL_DUPLEX, &rules)) in qca8k_parse_netdev()
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| /Linux-v6.6/security/apparmor/include/ |
| D | policy.h | 68 APPARMOR_ENFORCE, /* enforce access rules */
126 /* struct aa_ruleset - data covering mediation rules
129 * @policy: general match rules governing policy
130 * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
152 /* struct aa_attachment - data and rules for a profiles attachment
179 * @attach: attachment rules for the profile
180 * @rules: rules to be enforced
189 * attachments are determined by profile X transition rules.
211 struct list_head rules; member
275 static inline aa_state_t RULE_MEDIATES(struct aa_ruleset *rules, in RULE_MEDIATES() argument
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| /Linux-v6.6/Documentation/admin-guide/aoe/ |
| D | udev.txt | 1 # These rules tell udev what device nodes to create for aoe support.
11 # udev_rules="/etc/udev/rules.d/"
12 # bash# ls /etc/udev/rules.d/
13 # 10-wacom.rules 50-udev.rules
15 # /etc/udev/rules.d/60-aoe.rules
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| D | udev-install.sh | 1 # install the aoe-specific udev rules from udev.txt into
22 # find the directory where udev rules are stored, often
23 # /etc/udev/rules.d
27 rules_d=/etc/udev/rules.d
30 echo "$me Error: cannot find udev rules directory" 1>&2
33 sh -xc "cp `dirname $0`/udev.txt $rules_d/60-aoe.rules"
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| /Linux-v6.6/net/netfilter/ |
| D | nft_set_pipapo.c | 56 * represented as one or more rules, depending on the number of composing
61 * Rules are mapped between fields through an array of x, n pairs, with each
62 * item mapping a matched rule to one or more rules. The position of the pair in
65 * next-field rules the current rule maps to.
108 * or multiple rules for ranges. Ranges are expanded to composing netmasks
116 * - insert references to the rules in the lookup table, selecting buckets
144 * rules from the lookup table to rules belonging to the same entry in
147 * Note that as rules map to contiguous ranges of rules, given how netmask
182 * we need to map rules for 10.0.0.5 in lookup table #0 (rule #0) to 1024
183 * in lookup table #1 (rule #0) and rules for 192.168.1.0-192.168.2.1
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| D | nft_set_pipapo.h | 52 /* Each n-bit range maps to up to n * 2 rules */
92 * @n: Number of rules (in next field) this rule maps to
114 * @rules: Number of inserted rules
123 unsigned long rules; member
179 int pipapo_refill(unsigned long *map, int len, int rules, unsigned long *dst,
235 * of rules (composing netmasks) the entries expand to. We compute the worst
252 unsigned long rules; in pipapo_estimate_size() local
258 * field can expand to up to n * 2 rules in each bucket, and in pipapo_estimate_size()
261 rules = ilog2(desc->field_len[i] * BITS_PER_BYTE) * 2; in pipapo_estimate_size()
262 entry_size += rules * in pipapo_estimate_size()
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| /Linux-v6.6/kernel/kcsan/ |
| D | permissive.h | 3 * Special rules for ignoring entire classes of data-racy memory accesses. None
4 * of the rules here imply that such data races are generally safe!
6 * All rules in this file can be configured via CONFIG_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE. Keep
20 * Access ignore rules based on address.
35 * Data race ignore rules based on access type and value change patterns.
44 * Rules here are only for plain read accesses, so that we still report in kcsan_ignore_data_race()
70 * The rules here will ignore the data races if we observe no more than in kcsan_ignore_data_race()
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| /Linux-v6.6/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/ |
| D | Kconfig | 13 A VCAP is essentially a TCAM with rules consisting of
24 The VCAP implementation provides switchcore independent handling of rules
27 - Creating and deleting rules
28 - Updating and getting rules
32 access rules via the API in a platform independent way, with the
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| /Linux-v6.6/security/smack/ |
| D | Kconfig | 17 bool "Reporting on access granted by Smack rules"
21 Enable the bring-up ("b") access mode in Smack rules.
26 rules. The developer can use the information to
27 identify which rules are necessary and what accesses
54 delivering a signal in the Smack rules.
|
| /Linux-v6.6/Documentation/filesystems/ |
| D | directory-locking.rst | 16 1) read access. Locking rules: caller locks directory we are accessing.
19 2) object creation. Locking rules: same as above, but the lock is taken
22 3) object removal. Locking rules: caller locks parent, finds victim,
25 4) rename() that is _not_ cross-directory. Locking rules: caller locks the
33 5) link creation. Locking rules:
43 rules:
62 The rules above obviously guarantee that all directories that are going to be
122 But locking rules for cross-directory rename guarantee that we do not
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| /Linux-v6.6/Documentation/sound/designs/ |
| D | tracepoints.rst | 116 struct snd_pcm_hardware and rules of constraints in the runtime. The
117 structure describes capabilities of handled hardware. The rules describes
120 to compute the target parameter. ALSA PCM core registers some rules to the
129 2. In the same callback, drivers are also expected to register additional rules
156 device, rules of constraint and name of the changed parameter, in order. The
157 field for rules of constraint consists of two sub-fields; index of applied rule
158 and total number of rules added to the runtime. As an exception, the index 000
159 means that the parameter is changed by ALSA PCM core, regardless of the rules.
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| /Linux-v6.6/tools/perf/tests/shell/lib/ |
| D | perf_metric_validation.py | 13 self.rules = None
383 # Create metric set for relationship rules
384 for rule in self.rules:
432 def remove_unsupported_rules(self, rules): argument
434 for rule in rules:
446 Create full rules which includes:
447 1) All the rules from the "relationshi_rules" file
450 Reindex all the rules to avoid repeated RuleIndex
453 rules = data['RelationshipRules']
455 self.rules = self.remove_unsupported_rules(rules)
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| /Linux-v6.6/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ |
| D | Smack.rst | 50 load the Smack access rules
154 This interface allows modification of existing access control rules.
217 This interface allows access control rules in addition to
218 the system defined rules to be specified. The format accepted
232 This interface allows access control rules in addition to
233 the system defined rules to be specified. The format accepted
248 This interface allows process specific access rules to be
249 defined. These rules are only consulted if access would
255 This interface allows process specific access rules to be
256 defined. These rules are only consulted if access would
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