1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2 /*
3  * AppArmor security module
4  *
5  * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
6  *
7  * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
8  * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
9  */
10 
11 #include "include/apparmor.h"
12 #include "include/audit.h"
13 #include "include/cred.h"
14 #include "include/label.h"
15 #include "include/net.h"
16 #include "include/policy.h"
17 #include "include/secid.h"
18 
19 #include "net_names.h"
20 
21 
22 struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = {
23 	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask",	AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
24 	{ }
25 };
26 
27 static const char * const net_mask_names[] = {
28 	"unknown",
29 	"send",
30 	"receive",
31 	"unknown",
32 
33 	"create",
34 	"shutdown",
35 	"connect",
36 	"unknown",
37 
38 	"setattr",
39 	"getattr",
40 	"setcred",
41 	"getcred",
42 
43 	"chmod",
44 	"chown",
45 	"chgrp",
46 	"lock",
47 
48 	"mmap",
49 	"mprot",
50 	"unknown",
51 	"unknown",
52 
53 	"accept",
54 	"bind",
55 	"listen",
56 	"unknown",
57 
58 	"setopt",
59 	"getopt",
60 	"unknown",
61 	"unknown",
62 
63 	"unknown",
64 	"unknown",
65 	"unknown",
66 	"unknown",
67 };
68 
69 
70 /* audit callback for net specific fields */
audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer * ab,void * va)71 void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
72 {
73 	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
74 
75 	audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
76 	if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family])
77 		audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
78 	else
79 		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family);
80 	audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
81 	if (sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type])
82 		audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]);
83 	else
84 		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", aad(sa)->net.type);
85 	audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", aad(sa)->net.protocol);
86 
87 	if (aad(sa)->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
88 		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
89 		aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request, NULL, 0,
90 				   net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
91 
92 		if (aad(sa)->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
93 			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
94 			aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied, NULL, 0,
95 					   net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
96 		}
97 	}
98 	if (aad(sa)->peer) {
99 		audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
100 		aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
101 				FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
102 	}
103 }
104 
105 /* Generic af perm */
aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile * profile,struct common_audit_data * sa,u32 request,u16 family,int type)106 int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
107 		       u32 request, u16 family, int type)
108 {
109 	struct aa_perms perms = { };
110 	unsigned int state;
111 	__be16 buffer[2];
112 
113 	AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX);
114 	AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX);
115 
116 	if (profile_unconfined(profile))
117 		return 0;
118 	state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET);
119 	if (!state)
120 		return 0;
121 
122 	buffer[0] = cpu_to_be16(family);
123 	buffer[1] = cpu_to_be16((u16) type);
124 	state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &buffer,
125 				 4);
126 	aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms);
127 	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
128 
129 	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb);
130 }
131 
aa_af_perm(struct aa_label * label,const char * op,u32 request,u16 family,int type,int protocol)132 int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
133 	       int type, int protocol)
134 {
135 	struct aa_profile *profile;
136 	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(sa, op, NULL, family, type, protocol);
137 
138 	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
139 			aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &sa, request, family,
140 					   type));
141 }
142 
aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label * label,const char * op,u32 request,struct sock * sk)143 static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
144 			    struct sock *sk)
145 {
146 	int error = 0;
147 
148 	AA_BUG(!label);
149 	AA_BUG(!sk);
150 
151 	if (!unconfined(label)) {
152 		struct aa_profile *profile;
153 		DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
154 
155 		error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
156 			    aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk));
157 	}
158 
159 	return error;
160 }
161 
aa_sk_perm(const char * op,u32 request,struct sock * sk)162 int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk)
163 {
164 	struct aa_label *label;
165 	int error;
166 
167 	AA_BUG(!sk);
168 	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
169 
170 	/* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */
171 	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
172 	error = aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sk);
173 	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
174 
175 	return error;
176 }
177 
178 
aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label * label,const char * op,u32 request,struct socket * sock)179 int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
180 		      struct socket *sock)
181 {
182 	AA_BUG(!label);
183 	AA_BUG(!sock);
184 	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
185 
186 	return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk);
187 }
188 
189 #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
apparmor_secmark_init(struct aa_secmark * secmark)190 static int apparmor_secmark_init(struct aa_secmark *secmark)
191 {
192 	struct aa_label *label;
193 
194 	if (secmark->label[0] == '*') {
195 		secmark->secid = AA_SECID_WILDCARD;
196 		return 0;
197 	}
198 
199 	label = aa_label_strn_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label,
200 				    secmark->label, strlen(secmark->label),
201 				    GFP_ATOMIC, false, false);
202 
203 	if (IS_ERR(label))
204 		return PTR_ERR(label);
205 
206 	secmark->secid = label->secid;
207 
208 	return 0;
209 }
210 
aa_secmark_perm(struct aa_profile * profile,u32 request,u32 secid,struct common_audit_data * sa,struct sock * sk)211 static int aa_secmark_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, u32 secid,
212 			   struct common_audit_data *sa, struct sock *sk)
213 {
214 	int i, ret;
215 	struct aa_perms perms = { };
216 
217 	if (profile->secmark_count == 0)
218 		return 0;
219 
220 	for (i = 0; i < profile->secmark_count; i++) {
221 		if (!profile->secmark[i].secid) {
222 			ret = apparmor_secmark_init(&profile->secmark[i]);
223 			if (ret)
224 				return ret;
225 		}
226 
227 		if (profile->secmark[i].secid == secid ||
228 		    profile->secmark[i].secid == AA_SECID_WILDCARD) {
229 			if (profile->secmark[i].deny)
230 				perms.deny = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
231 			else
232 				perms.allow = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
233 
234 			if (profile->secmark[i].audit)
235 				perms.audit = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
236 		}
237 	}
238 
239 	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
240 
241 	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb);
242 }
243 
apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label * label,char * op,u32 request,u32 secid,struct sock * sk)244 int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request,
245 			   u32 secid, struct sock *sk)
246 {
247 	struct aa_profile *profile;
248 	DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
249 
250 	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
251 				    aa_secmark_perm(profile, request, secid,
252 						    &sa, sk));
253 }
254 #endif
255