Lines Matching refs:processes

11 monitored processes. The data leakage is possible both in scenarios of
52 To perform security checks, the Linux implementation splits processes
53 into two categories [6]_ : a) privileged processes (whose effective user
55 processes (whose effective UID is nonzero). Privileged processes bypass
57 monitoring is fully available to privileged processes without access,
60 Unprivileged processes are subject to a full security permission check
66 independently enabled and disabled on per-thread basis for processes and
69 Unprivileged processes with enabled CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability are treated
70 as privileged processes with respect to perf_events performance
73 Unprivileged processes using perf_events system call API is also subject
76 processes provided with CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability are effectively
79 Other capabilities being granted to unprivileged processes can
81 performance analysis of monitored processes or a system. For example,
128 or root running processes with CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_SETFCAP [6]_
134 perf_events/Perf *scope* and *access* control for unprivileged processes
151      imposed but ignored for unprivileged processes with CAP_IPC_LOCK
160      unprivileged processes with CAP_IPC_LOCK capability.
167      unprivileged processes with CAP_IPC_LOCK capability.
190 The amount of memory available to user processes for capturing
193 per-cpu limits of memory allowed for mapping by the user processes to
202 wants to start two or more performance monitoring processes, the user is
204 monitoring processes, for example, using the --mmap-pages Perf record
206 allocates all available 4128 KiB and the other processes will fail to
210 for processes with the CAP_IPC_LOCK capability. Thus, perf_events/Perf