Lines Matching full:capabilities

2 /* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o.
30  * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities.
32  * the file capabilities to be applied, and the setuid-root
34  * to get full privilege on a kernel without file capabilities
35  * support.  So in that case we do not raise capabilities.
44 			" effective capabilities. Therefore not raising all"  in warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed()
45 			" capabilities.\n", fname);  in warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed()
75 		/* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */  in cap_capable()
125  * task's capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed.
162  * capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed.
196  * This function retrieves the capabilities of the nominated task and returns
215  * Determine whether the inheritable capabilities are limited to the old
230  * cap_capset - Validate and apply proposed changes to current's capabilities
233  * @effective: A pointer to the proposed new effective capabilities set
234  * @inheritable: A pointer to the proposed new inheritable capabilities set
235  * @permitted: A pointer to the proposed new permitted capabilities set
257 		/* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */  in cap_capset()
623 	 * do not have enough capabilities, we return an error if they are  in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()
624 	 * missing some "forced" (aka file-permitted) capabilities.  in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()
634  * @cpu_caps:	vfs capabilities
782  * @has_fcap: Are any file capabilities set?
787  * SECURE_NOROOT.  If file capabilities are set, they won't be combined with
890 	/* Process setpcap binaries and capabilities for uid 0 */  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
1059  * cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of
1063  *  {r,e,s}uid != 0, the permitted and effective capabilities are
1067  *  capabilities of the process are cleared.
1070  *  capabilities are set to the permitted capabilities.
1078  * A process may, via prctl(), elect to keep its capabilities when it
1104 		 * by exec to drop capabilities.  We should make sure that  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1132 		/* juggle the capabilities to follow [RES]UID changes unless  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1142 		 * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1261  * Allow process control functions (sys_prctl()) to alter capabilities; may
1286 	 * capabilities are not in use) to a system using filesystem  in cap_task_prctl()
1287 	 * capabilities only - as the POSIX.1e draft intended.  in cap_task_prctl()
1316 			 *     the "sendmail capabilities bug")  in cap_task_prctl()